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Most companies, if not sold, merged or otherwise ceasing to exist individually, face a 
decline in performance at some point of their existence. While there is no universal def-
inition on what qualifies as performance decline, in this report it is understood as an ex-
istence-threatening deterioration in an organisational performance induced by mala-
daption to changes in environment. However, if not drawn to a bankruptcy or otherwise 
liquidated, there must be a performance upturn to come over the existence-threatening 
state. In this study, such performance turnaround means ensuring the continuing exist-
ence of an organisation through performance improvement and sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
While decline-turnaround phenomenon is rather widely researched area, there is not 
much said on that topic from the point-of-view of competitive dynamics (i.e. how com-
petitors interact in the marketplace via the ongoing exchange of competitive actions). 
This angle seems very relevant, though, as it is the external environment – namely mar-
ket environment – where the customers lie, so it is how a company acts and succeeds in 
this competition that eventually decides between success and failure. Research problem 
in this study is to understand the role of competitive dynamics in corporate turnaround. 
Can the reasons for stopping the declining performance and returning to (more) success-
ful track be derived from the competitive actions a company performs vis-à-vis its com-
petitor(s)? If such observation is valid, what things in competitive behaviour vis-à-vis 
the competitor(s), i.e. competitive dynamics, support transition from decline to turna-
round? 
This paper analyses Finnish (consumer goods) retail trade from late 1970s to early 2000 
as a case study to support the analysis of the research problem. While there were several 
competitive companies active in the industry during this period, the by far most im-
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portant players were S-Group and Kesko. In addition to this case study (focusing on the 
competitive dynamics between S-Group and Kesko during 1980-2000), an extensive 
research on existing literature in the fields of decline-turnaround, competitive dynamics 
and firm performance was conducted, along with interviews of two former CEOs of S-
Group. 
In the light of this study and context of S-Group vs. Kesko, it can be argued that being 
(more) active and aggressive in performing competitive actions towards consistent goals 
enable successful turnaround, while the diversity of action types, i.e. how the actions 
are performed, is not crucial for such improved performance. These findings are rather 
in line with existing literature. S-Group’s activeness, aggressiveness and focus especial-
ly on Divestiture in non-core business (i.e. retrenchment) in the 1980s seems lot like an 
‘academic text-book example put into real life’ in terms of competitive behaviour in the 
stabilisation phase of a successful turnaround.  
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Useimpien yritysten toiminta- ja suorituskyky heikkenee jossain olemassaolon 
vaiheessa, mikäli niitä ei ole myyty, fuusioitu tai ne eivät muuten lakkaa olemasta 
itsenäisenä ennen tällaista elinkaaren vaihetta. Tällaiselle yrityksen taantumiselle (eng. 
decline) ei ole yleispätevää määritelmää, ja tässä raportissa se ymmärretään koko 
yrityksen olemassaoloa uhkaavaksi organisaation suorituskyvyn heikkenemiseksi, joka 
johtuu sopeutumattomuudesta ympäristön muutoksiin. Toisaalta, sikäli kun yritys ei 
vajoa konkurssiin tai muuten lakkaa olemasta, on tapahduttava suorituskyvyn nousua 
olemassaoloa uhkaavan tilanteen kääntämiseksi. Tässä tutkimuksessa tällainen 
tervehtyminen (eng. turnaround) tarkoittaa organisaation pitkän tähtäimen 
olemassaolon varmistamista suorituskyvyn parantamisen ja kestävän kilpailuedun 
avulla. 
 
Samalla kun taantuminen-tervehtyminen -ilmiöitä on tutkittu melko laajasti, aihetta ei 
ole juurikaan käsitelty kilpailudynamiikan näkökulmasta (ts. kuinka kilpailevat yritykset 
ovat vuorovaikutuksessa markkinoilla kilpailullisten toimenpiteiden ja niiden 
’vaihtamisen’ kautta). Tämä näkökulma on kuitenkin merkityksellinen, koska asiakkaat 
ovat oleellinen osa tätä ulkoista markkinaympäristöä, ja siten yrityksen toiminta ja 
menestyminen tässä kilpailussa on lopulta ratkaiseva tekijä menestyksen ja 
epäonnistumisen välillä. Tutkimusongelmana on ymmärtää kilpailudynamiikan 
merkitys yrityksen tervehtymisessä. Voidaanko taantumisen pysäyttämisen ja 
tervehtymisen syyt johtaa kilpailutoimista, joita yritys suorittaa kilpailijaansa nähden? 
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Jos tällainen havainto on pätevä, mitkä tekijät ja piirteet kilpailudynamiikassa tukevat 
onnistunutta tervehtymistä taantumasta? 
 
Tässä tutkimuksessa hyödynnetään case-aiheena ja tutkimusongelman analysoinnin 
tueksi Suomen vähittäiskauppan alaa 1970-luvun lopulta 2000-luvun alkuun. Alalla oli 
tällä periodilla useita toimijoita, mutta ylivoimaisesti keskeisimmät toimijat olivat S-
Ryhmä ja Kesko. Tämän case-tutkimuksen (keskittyen S-Ryhmän ja Keskon väliseen 
kilpailudynamiikkaan vuosina 1980–2000) lisäksi tehtiin laaja katsaus olemassa olevaan 
kirjallisuuteen taantumisen, tervehtymisen, kilpailudynamiikan ja yrityksen 
suorituskyvyn aloilla, sekä nojauduttiin S-Ryhmän kahden entisen toimitusjohtajan 
haastatteluihin. 
 
Tämän tutkimuksen ja S-Ryhmän ja Keskon välisen kilpailudynamiikan kontekstin 
perusteella voidaan todeta, että (kilpailijaa) aktiivisempi ja aggressiivisempi 
kilpailutoimien suorittaminen kohti johdonmukaisia tavoitteita mahdollistaa 
onnistuneen tervehtymisen, kun taas kilpailutoimien monimuotoisuus, ts. miten 
toimenpiteet suoritetaan, ei ole ratkaisevaa suorituskyvyn parantumiselle. Nämä 
havainnot ovat melko yhdenmukaisia olemassa olevan kirjallisuuden kanssa. S-Ryhmän 
aktiivisuus, aggressiivisuus ja keskittyminen etenkin ydinliiketoiminnan ulkopuolisten 
rönsyjen siivoamiseen (ts. saneeraus) 1980-luvulla muistuttaa oppikirjaesimerkkiä siitä, 
millaisella kilpailullisella käyttäytymisellä vakautetaan taantuvan yrityksen asema 
matkalla onnistuneeseen tervehtymiseen. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Decline and turnaround in organisational perfor-
mance 
Most companies, if not within some years or possibly a decade after establishment sold, 
merged or otherwise ceasing to exist individually, face (a major) decline in performance 
at some time in their existence (Hofer 1980, p. 20). Subsequently, Hofer (ibid.) contin-
ues, the organizational response is a major effort to “turn the company around”. Key 
questions when facing such an effort according to Hofer are: i) “are such efforts worth-
while?”, ii) “can they be successful?”, and, iii) “what type of turnaround strategy has the 
best prospects for success?”.  
The decline-turnaround process has been studied from various academic aspects with 
one of the most popular research fields (note link to Hofer’s 3rd question) covering the 
ways managers respond to decline (see Barker & Barr 2002, p.963, for a listing of se-
lected literature). While somewhat obviously these studies differ in their conclusions, it 
is also notable to mention that this might be partly explained by the fact that there is no 
single, bulletproof definition for a decline and / or turnaround in organizational perfor-
mance. I.e. it may even be argued that trying to find universally successful turnaround 
strategies is a waste of time, as the decline preceding (a successful) turnaround is not 
only case-specific by nature and / or causes, but also in terms of severity. Someone 
might see a company with a merely decreasing operating profit (probably for couple of 
years in a row at least) as a worthwhile case for studying decline / turnaround, whereas 
another researcher might require various declining performance indicators (market 
share, sales, ROI etc.) for several years in order for that case to qualify as a declining 
organization. And accordingly, in some studies successful turnaround might require ex-
ceeding the performance levels prior decline, while others could argue that mere surviv-
al (instead of e.g. a bankruptcy) is enough to make a call that an organization has sur-
vived a decline. 
So the first (and probably to some extent worthwhile) step is to ‘define’ decline and 
turnaround in a bit more detailed way than just as ‘changes in organizational perfor-
mance’ (in this study analysed in chapter 2.1). As this analysis gives insight to the ques-
tion of “what is decline and turnaround?”, the following step of understanding the stag-
es, transitions between stages and reasons for these transitions, i.e. the decline-
turnaround process, takes us closer to getting some valuable ‘lessons learned’ regarding 
this phenomenon. This processual view is covered more in chapter 2.2. But even if tak-
ing just the ultimate stages, i.e. decline and turnaround, and by analysing the transition 
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from former to latter and reasons for this, one is already close to the fundamental re-
search questions within the field (e.g. Hofer’s 3rd key question: “what type of turna-
round strategy has the best prospects for success?”). Existing research on this specific 
area, i.e. successful turnaround strategies, is analysed in chapter 4, with the competitive 
‘layer’ (the one ‘enabling’ firm performance) of decline-turnaround phenomenon pre-
ceding this in chapter 3.  
 
1.1.1. Competitive position affecting the performance level 
As mentioned above, decline and turnaround, even if vaguely defined, are about chang-
es in firm performance. Ferrier et al. (1999) discuss in their study, that market share ero-
sion and dethronement (i.e. organizational decline) can be largely explained by the 
characteristics of competitive actions performed by firms on the same competitive field. 
Ferrier et al. (ibid., p. 372) find out more precisely, that market leaders are more likely 
to face such decline if they are less (competitively) aggressive, carry out simpler reper-
toires of actions, and carry out competitive actions more slowly. 
As further discussed in chapter 3, somewhat opposite views from those of Ferrier et al. 
(1999) have also been presented, as for example Teece (1987) comments that imitators 
(i.e. ‘slower’ in terms of carrying out a competitive action) may well generate bigger 
profit from a new product due to e.g. their lower development costs. As there was no 
universally agreed definition for decline and / or turnaround, neither is there one for a 
‘winning recipe of competitive dynamics’. However, what has been agreed rather unan-
imously is that (factors capturing) competitive dynamics within an industry are im-
portant predictors of firm performance (Jacobson, 1992, Smith et al., 1992, Young et al., 
1996). 
From the competitive point of view, the whole idea of organizational strategy is to de-
fend and improve competitive position (Porter 1980), i.e. the relative competitive ad-
vantage a firm possesses vis-à-vis its competitors. Strategy materialises in competitive 
actions, which in turn enable competitive advantage defining competitive position.  
This three-level approach is fundamental in this study: i.e. decline and turnaround ‘hap-
pen’ in relation to firm performance (i), for which competitive dynamics are important 
factors (ii). And as just described above, strategy materialises in the competitive actions 
performed by a company (iii), and these actions are ‘an ingredient’ in industry-wide 
competitive dynamics. 
Therefore, analysing competitive dynamics ‘in between’ strategy and (changes in) per-
formance seems like a valuable part in forming a comprehensive view of a specific de-
cline-turnaround case. 
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1.2. Introduction to case-companies 
This paper analyses Finnish (consumer goods) retail trade from late 1970s to early 2000 
as a case study to support the analysis of research problem. While there were several 
competitive companies active in the industry during this period, the by far most im-
portant players were S-Group and Kesko.  
S-Group was and is a Finnish network of companies in the retail and service trade with 
the core of its existence based on cooperative ownership. Throughout the history S-
Group has been active in a wide variety of businesses (see more in chapter 5.1.1), and in 
2013 S-Group’s business portfolio consisted of grocery trade, consumer goods trade, 
service station stores and fuel trade, travel industry and hospitality business, automotive 
trade and agriculture trade. (S-Kanava 2013a)  
Kesko is a listed trading sector company. It manages retail store chains and produces 
services for e.g. retail store chains' purchasing, logistics, network development and data 
management. Kesko's operations include food, home and speciality goods, building and 
home improvement, and car and machinery trades. (Kesko 2013)  
Kesko as such means basically the centralized group under Kesko Oyj, the publicly 
listed entity. Therefore, Kesko in broader extent is officially K-Group, which, in addi-
tion to the Kesko Group, includes also the K-retailers, i.e. independent entrepreneurs 
operating the stores. However, in this study Kesko is used as a common name for all K-
Group’s activities in consumer goods retailing. (Kesko 2013) 
 
1.3. Research problem and objectives 
Research problem in this study is to understand the role of competitive dynamics in cor-
porate turnaround. Can the reasons for stopping the declining performance and returning 
to (more) successful track be derived from the competitive actions a company performs 
vis-à-vis its competitor(s)? If such observation is valid, what things in competitive be-
haviour vis-à-vis the competitor(s), i.e. competitive dynamics, support transition from 
decline to turnaround? 
 
1.4. Research methodology 
Research methodologies can be broadly divided into qualitative and quantitative. Same 
phenomenon can be studied with different methods, basically from different ‘angles’. In 
  4
brief, a research methodology should be chosen based on the purpose of a research (or 
research problem and objectives) (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, p. 22). Qualitative research 
aims at describing and / or understanding a certain phenomenon or (a set of) action(s) 
(ibid., p. 61). The purpose of this study is to understand the role of competitive dynam-
ics behind (in the case study part, a specific) corporate turnaround, so quite naturally 
mostly qualitative research methods are used. This study focuses largely on one case 
company, S-Group, and the decline-turnaround phenomenon faced by it, while the com-
petitive dynamics ‘layer’ includes also thorough analysis of S-Group’s main competitor, 
Kesko. As the number of ‘cases’ is thus small, the study fits well the requirements for 
qualitative research, i.e. it (qualitative research) not aiming at making statistical general-
isations. While the study focuses on very limited number of cases (basically one case 
company with another used in ‘mirroring’ purposes), the analysis of the case(s) is very 
thorough. Basically, the ‘academic criteria’ of the analysis is quality instead of quantity. 
(ibid., p. 18) 
Quantitative research involves often hypothesis. Qualitative research does not aim to 
'test' and / or 'prove' the researcher’s hypothesis: the researcher should have no ‘antici-
pation’ on the research problem or its results. (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, p. 19) Prior to 
beginning my research work I had no major presumptions on the research problem or 
phenomena around it, i.e. if for example how S-Group had differed from Kesko in terms 
of its competitive actions during the studied timeline. The goal of qualitative research is 
not proving existing claims / arguments, but to explore, understand and reveal certain 
‘facts’ or phenomena (Hirsjärvi et al. 2000, p. 152).  
Qualitative research is a process, where different stages of research work, data gather-
ing, analysis, interpretation and reporting are more or less tied together (Eskola & Su-
oranta 1998, p. 16). This characteristic of qualitative research is present also in the re-
search work behind this study, as certain analyses and interpretations have been made 
already during data gathering, and the ‘results’ of these have then somewhat affected the 
needs for further collection of background material. 
In qualitative research the researcher has a lot of freedom of interpretation, which then 
again requires certain ‘imagination’ (ibid., p. 20). While solid theoretical background 
may increase the objectivity of a study, the researcher can never fully ignore his / her 
own values. Therefore, qualitative research cannot reach full objectivity – the researcher 
and action(s) / phenomenon under research are always tied into each other. In other 
words, qualitative methodology recognizes that the subjectivity of the researcher is in-
timately involved in scientific research. Further, the results of qualitative research are 
conditional, i.e. arguments are ‘restricted’ by certain time and place. (Hirsjärvi et al. 
2000, p. 152) Thus, should this study be performed after some years, the results / con-
clusions might be different. 
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1.4.1. Choosing of the case  
While the case study focuses on the competitive field within Finnish retail trade, the 
main company under case analysis is S-Group. Short introduction to S-Group is pre-
sented in chapter 1.2, while more detailed company presentation as well as description 
of the decline-turnaround experienced by the company is in chapter 5. Obviously main 
criteria for choosing the case company was indeed the decline and especially turnaround 
phase at some point of the company’s somewhat recent history. For S-Group such phase 
materialized in 1980s and 1990s, as further described in chapter 5.3.  
Another factor affecting the choice of case environment is the ‘layer’ of competitive 
dynamics. This excludes monopolistic businesses / industries, while on the other hand 
the number of (relevant) competitors was aimed at to be limited in order to allow in-
depth analysis and benchmarking of competitive dynamics between the case company 
and its competitor(s). In Finnish consumer goods retailing this characteristic is well met, 
as S-Group and Kesko have more or less dominated the market throughout the years. 
Thirdly, the industry of the case company was ideally to be rather stable and defensive, 
i.e. not too sensitive to economic cycles, as the more limited the impact of external de-
cline forces (see chapter 4.1), the more emphasis can be given to internal strategies, re-
sources and decision-making (behind competitive actions). I.e. if the decline and turna-
round were mostly explainable by e.g. industry dethronement, it would not be that inter-
esting to study differences in competitive behaviour between selected competitors. Con-
sumer goods retailing is obviously very defensive industry, as demand for e.g. groceries 
is rather stable no matter what economic cycle (Airaksinen 2008). 
All in all, S-Group and Kesko dominating the stable Finnish consumer goods retail 
trade form an interesting pair when analysing the research problem of this study. Basi-
cally, one of them losing market share has meant another gaining it. In addition, as the 
market has been more or less stable, the effect of external forces may be assumed to be 
limited. The validity of analysing this pair (and then S-Group in more detail in terms of 
decline-turnaround) can be illustrated by briefly thinking about somewhat contradictory 
case examples / industries:  
 Apple Inc. – the world leading consumer electronics company: the company has 
during the last 20 years or so been a dominating player in e.g. laptops, portable 
music players, mobile phones, tablet computers and digital content delivery / 
online distribution. Determining the relevant competitive field / market is chal-
lenging, as Apple has constantly introduced new products to markets not neces-
sarily even existing prior to Apple’s product launches. I.e. no ‘stable’ competi-
tion allowing for benchmarking with limited number of fixed set of competitors. 
(Isaacson 2011) 
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 Mining industry: the mining industry is subjected to string upswings and down-
swings in general economy. Cyclical and commodity companies share a com-
mon feature, insofar as e.g. their value (obviously based on their performance) is 
often more dependent on the movement of a macro variable (the commodity 
price or the growth in the underlying economy) than it is on firm specific charac-
teristics. (Damodaran 2009) Thus competitive actions and / or organization’s in-
ternal factors behind decline and / or turnaround can be largely overshadowed by 
external factors, to which the organization cannot influence. 
No matter how good or bad, the choice of the case setting is discretionary. This kind of 
discretionary selection applies well to qualitative research. Instead of discretionary 
sample selection, terms such as theoretical or purposeful selection can be used in con-
nection to qualitative research. (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, p. 61) However, the research-
er must be able to construct a strong theoretical background to his / her study, with this 
theoretical framework then steering the data gathering (ibid., p. 18). 
 
1.4.2. Data gathering 
Objective of qualitative research is not only to describe the gathered data, but also to 
create theoretically sustainable viewpoints from it (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, p. 62). Ob-
viously, the way of collecting data will have to be chosen according to the purpose of 
the research. This study exploits so called triangulation, which indicates that more than 
one method is used in order to ‘cross-check’ data from multiple sources. Triangulation 
is said to increase the credibility and validity of qualitative research. (ibid., p. 69) 
Most important material when analysing competitive dynamics behind S-Group’s turna-
round are (competitive) actions of S-Group and Kesko, gathered from the Annual Re-
ports of the respective companies. These comprehensive action lists are then refined to 
include only such competitive actions as defined in chapter 3.2.3. However, while these 
lists provide the main source for analysing S-Group turnaround through externally ob-
servable competitive actions, and even more importantly, the dynamics between S-
Group and Kesko, they are so called secondary sources. Primary sources in this study 
are the interviews of two former S-Group CEOs, with the findings from these interviews 
providing intelligence for understanding the thinking behind the externally observable 
competitive dynamics. (Hirsjärvi et al. 2000, p. 173) 
The abovementioned main sources of this research are supported by e.g. company de-
scriptions from their own web-sites, literature related to the history of Finnish consumer 
goods retailing, data related to the development of this market (e.g. market shares) and 
produced by external parties as well as industry analysis report produced by Cap Gemi-
ni Ernst & Young Finland in 2001 (in possession of the researcher). This additional ma-
terial is used for preparing the researcher for the analysis and interviews as well as sup-
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porting and making corrections to e.g. answers from the interviews. I.e., the process is 
again iterative, with the data gathering, analysis, interpretation and reporting tied to-
gether. 
An interview can be described as planned activity aiming at collecting information. 
Main difference to a discussion is that an interview is steered by the interviewer. 
(Hirsjärvi & Hurme 1991, p. 25) As a research method in qualitative research, inter-
viewing has many strengths: it is flexible and can reach a depth of detail from an inter-
viewee not possible through other methods. The purpose of an interview is to gain in-
sight into the research problem from the interviewee’s point-of-view, and also to under-
stand why he or she has this point-of-view; i.e. to gain insight into the ‘subjective’ un-
derstanding of those around us (Seidman 1998).  
As in the context of this study internal issues are separate from the externally visible 
actions, the researcher has to get access to the people inside the organization. And for 
the purpose of gaining in-depth insight from the interviewees (i.e. quality instead of 
quantity), I decided to interview two former CEOs of S-Group. 
Table 1: Persons interviewed 
Name CEO of S-Group (years) Interview date 
Jere Lahti 1988 – 2002 28 August, 2008 
Kari Neilimo 2002 – 2006  8 September, 2008 
 
Jere Lahti’s reign coincided almost completely with the turnaround phase of S-Group 
under analysis in this study. Thus, his views serve as an excellent insight into manage-
ment decisions made leading to a successful turnaround. Kari Neilimo’s period as the 
leader of S-Group is viewed as post-turnaround in terms of this study. However, his 
somewhat retrospective views can offer important ‘objectivity’ compared to e.g. Jere 
Lahti’s opinions. Also, most strategic decisions made during the turnaround had still 
strong impact on S-Group during Kari Neilimo’s leadership. 
There are several types of interviews, and the selection of a type to a particular situation 
should be again based on the purpose of the research (e.g. King 1994, p. 16). An inter-
view can be e.g. a structured interview, with detailed schedule and questions asked in a 
same specific order from all interviewees. In another end there is unstructured, conver-
sational interview, which, according to its name, resembles more a discussion than a 
formal interview. (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, p. 87, King 1994, pp. 14-15) Third main 
type of interview, and the one applied in this study, is called semi-structured interview. 
Main characteristics of semi-structured interview include engaging in a formal interview 
with ‘an interview guide’ or list of themes / questions, while at the same time giving a 
lot of ‘freedom’ for the interviewees to speak openly about their thoughts around the 
theme. Semi-structured interviews are often used in qualitative studies, and the style is 
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particularly useful when investigating a topic that is very personal to interviewees. 
(Eskola & Suoranta 1998, pp. 87-89, Hirsjärvi & Hurme 1991) In my case it was obvi-
ous, that the topic was very personal to the former S-Group CEOs, and giving them an 
open chance to tell their ‘stories’ was essential. Therefore, the choice of using semi-
structured interview was rather self-evident, as at least the decline-turnaround timescale 
and list of competitive actions served as themes around which the interviews had to fo-
cus on. 
 
1.4.3. Quality of the research 
The use of reliability and validity are common in quantitative research. Reliability in 
quantitative research is defined by Joppe (2000) as the extent to which results are con-
sistent over time and accurate representation of the total population under study. Golaf-
shani (2003, p. 601) claims by citing various authors, that the concept of reliability can 
even be misleading in qualitative research, as e.g. there isn’t a ‘population’ to be ‘statis-
tically represented’ by the result of the research. On the other hand, terms such as ‘de-
pendability’, ‘credibility’, ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘neutrality’ are used by Golafshani and 
other authors when trying to explain reliability in qualitative research (ibid.). To avoid 
this confusion of fully understanding the concept of reliability in qualitative research, 
Patton (2002) has concluded that reliability is a consequence of the validity in a study. 
Validity of a study is related to the question if the researcher studies exactly what he or 
she is supposed to study. However, Golafshani (2003, p. 602) finds strong arguments 
also against using the term validity in qualitative research, supported by e.g. Cho & 
Trent (2006). Overall, methods used for evaluating the quality of a quantitative research 
fit poorly to qualitative research, as the latter does not require objectivity as understood 
in the context of former (King 1994, pp. 30-31). The most important criteria of quality 
in qualitative research can thus be viewed to be the researcher himself / herself, and the 
evaluation of quality should take into account the whole research process (Eskola & Su-
oranta 1998, p. 211). 
I ended up using the criteria presented by Stenius et al. (2008) to evaluate the quality of 
this study: 
1. Significance of the data set and its social or cultural place 
2. Sufficiency of the data, and coverage of the analysis 
3. Transparency and repeatability of the analysis. 
The above criteria are well in line with the criteria presented by Mäkelä (1990) in Finn-
ish. 
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Significance of the data means basically that the data are worth analysing. However, 
Stenius et al. (2008, p. 85) argue that it is not easy to identify criteria for the signifi-
cance of data. And what comes to the significance of the data set of this study, Stenius 
et al. (2008, p. 85) state that when doing comparisons over time it is important to bear in 
mind that the social and cultural place of one and the same genre (e.g. texts produced by 
individuals) may vary from decade to decade. Main data for analysing the externally 
observable competitive dynamics behind S-Group turnaround consists of the competi-
tive actions collected from S-Group’s and Kesko’s Annual Reports. And as these re-
ports are ‘regulated’ by e.g. corporate governance rules and guidelines, the social and 
cultural state of the data should be rather constant over time. 
Sufficiency of data is also debatable measure in qualitative research. Basically, data col-
lection can be terminated when new cases no longer disclose new features. (Stenius et 
al. 2008, p. 85) In terms of the competitive actions performed by S-Group and Kesko, 
the lists collected from Annual Reports should constitute a thorough set of data, as the 
competitive actions are here defined as specific, detectable and externally directed com-
petitive moves (see chapter 3.2.1). Should the company not report a specific move (of 
course of a certain importance, i.e. neglecting irrelevant moves), it would likely not be 
(externally) detectable, at least later in time if not otherwise documented. Regarding in-
terviews, one could argue that the set of two former CEOs is not sufficient enough, but 
on the other hand there is no other person than Jere Lahti, who would have had such a 
thorough perspective and power to influence the turnaround in question. And by adding 
potentially more objective and retrospective view by interviewing his successor, Kari 
Neilimo, the data set in terms of the interviews could be argued to give sufficient 
enough background for understanding better the factors behind the externally detectable 
competitive actions. Finally, adding more case companies and / or benchmarking targets 
would not have been feasible in terms of the scope of this kind of study. This is sup-
ported by the coverage of the analysis criterion, related to which Stenius et al. (2008, p. 
86) mention that qualitative reports are often loosely impressionistic because the exces-
sive amount of material has made it unfeasible to analyse it carefully enough. 
Transparency of an analysis means that a reader is able to follow the researcher's rea-
soning. Repeatability of an analysis means that the rules of classification and interpreta-
tion have been presented so clearly that another researcher applying them will reach the 
same conclusions. Qualitative analysis, as earlier mentioned, is more subjective and less 
standardized than statistical, quantitative analysis. Thus, it is vital that the reader is giv-
en as exact a picture as possible of the chain of reasoning behind reported results. 
(Stenius et al. 2008, p. 86) However, at the same time the results of qualitative research 
are conditional, i.e. arguments are ‘restricted’ by certain time and place (Hirsjärvi et al. 
2000, p. 152). In this study both the transparency and repeatability can be argued 
through linking the interpretation to a solid theoretical background. On the other hand, 
one has to accept that the results from another researcher might vary from the results of 
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this study – not least due to long time scale under analysis and subjective, potentially 
over time changing, views of the interviewees. 
  11
2. THE CONCEPT OF DECLINE AND 
TURNAROUND 
2.1. Defining decline and turnaround 
To be able to study and analyse different decline-turnaround processes and the features 
of this phenomenon in general, it is imperative to understand what it actually means 
when a company is in decline. And as decline may well result in bankruptcy or dissolu-
tion (e.g. Weitzel & Jonsson 1989), it is also evident that some sort of criteria must be 
fulfilled in order to make the call that a turnaround has happened instead. Different 
causes, content, features and process characteristics of decline and turnaround will be 
covered further in this report, but in order to draw the line between the decline-
turnaround phenomenon and ‘normal’ fluctuation in company performance, specific cri-
teria defining decline and turnaround are discussed in the following. 
 
2.1.1. Quantitative measures for defining decline and turnaround 
Performance decline can have many causes and outcomes, but it isn’t straightforward 
either to notice decline just by e.g. observing financial figures. Hofer (1980, p. 21) men-
tions declining profitability as the main indicator of weakened performance, with de-
clines in sales and market share also having some importance. However – already at that 
time – Hofer also claimed that more and more focus was given to return on investment 
(ROI) when encountering turnaround situations in order to evaluate asset utilization and 
performance efficiency. This trend makes sense, as it is essential to realise that declines 
in absolute sales, profit and/or e.g. personnel figures don’t necessarily imply for decline 
in firm performance, as companies may downsize through asset divestments and spin-
offs even if everything is going fine in these businesses. For example, Johnson (1996, p. 
442) argues, that poor performance is only one of five main rationales for downscoping, 
others being environmental changes, firm governance, strategy in general and financial 
restructuring. Thus, it is evident, that relative figures should be observed when evaluat-
ing if a company is in true performance decline or not. 
Also, in one of the earlier studies of decline and turnaround, Hambrick & Schecter 
(1983) use specific and numeric criteria when selecting businesses to their research. 
Consistent with the trend mentioned by Hofer (1980), they employ pre-tax ROI as the 
main indicator to identify appropriate turnaround cases. A business had to have an aver-
age pre-tax ROI below 10% for the first two years under study to be considered declin-
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ing. Successful turnarounds were respectively defined as businesses which achieved an 
average pre-tax ROI above 20% for the following two years. This kind of classification 
doesn’t go without critique, as it neglects the timing of the actual turnaround. Even if 
the average ROI increases from below 10% (years one and two) to above 20% (years 
three and four), the trend might have been growing and thus the actual turnaround hap-
pened already before this four-year period. In addition to timing critique, the approach 
is obviously neglecting e.g. industry specific differences in asset turnover characteris-
tics: for example a manufacturing and / or heavy industry company with significant tan-
gible asset base is hardly able to match the average ROI levels of asset-light businesses 
such as e.g. consulting business having basically only its employees as ‘an asset’. 
To overcome the deficiency of actual timing of decline and turnaround, Pearce & Rob-
bins (1992, p.295) as well as Barker & Mone (1994, pp. 399-400) required more sophis-
ticated ROI and ROS (return on sales) development from the businesses in order to con-
sider them as decline-turnaround cases in their studies. First, a company had to have two 
successive years of increasing ROI and ROS followed by simultaneous declines in ROI 
and ROS for a minimum of two years. This definition secures that a firm must have 
been prospering prior to decline, which then lasts at least the mentioned two years. It 
was also required that the actual decline in ROI and ROS was greater than the industry 
average, which is to some extent addressing also the abovementioned issue regarding 
industry characteristics. 
Subsequent to decline, a successful turnaround was realised if a company achieved at 
least two consecutive years of simultaneous increases in ROI and ROS again at a rate 
higher than the industry average. In addition, these increased ROI and ROS levels had 
to overtake the pre-downturn levels of corresponding figures. (Pearce & Robbins 1992, 
pp. 295-296) 
The abovementioned classifications define explicitly if a company has suffered a dip in 
its performance and subsequently recovered from it. And by requiring the two-year (or 
longer) trend when studying decline as well as increase in profitability, the ‘model’ ex-
cludes brief volatilities in performance. However, there is no exact limit for the elapsed 
time between the downturn and recovery. To overcome this particular issue, Balgobin & 
Pandit (2001) added further requirements in their research of successful turnarounds. 
Firstly, a period of at least three years was required both in ROI decline and in the fol-
lowing positive trend. Secondly, and as a more concrete addition to previously men-
tioned classifications, Balgobin & Pandit allowed no more than two years between de-
cline and recovery. Third addition by Balgobin & Pandit was that ROI had to be nega-
tive for at least one year in decline, and furthermore exceed the return to risk-free in-
vestment in recovery. (ibid. p. 315) 
To have more ground and evidence on true financial deterioration, a ‘Z score’ devel-
oped by Altman (1968) has been used by e.g. Sudarsanam & Lai (2001) and Barker & 
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Duhaime (1997). This Z score is a multivariate formula for a measurement of the finan-
cial health and especially bankruptcy likelihood of a firm. It combines five financial ra-
tios using a weighting system1, and studies have shown that its accuracy is rather high 
(~80%). (Livingstone & Grossman 2001) 
As these abovementioned studies show, there isn’t one specific and ‘right’ way to define 
decline and turnaround using financial and/or performance figures. An illustrative com-
pilation of these various definitions for selecting appropriate decline-turnaround cases is 
presented in Figure 1. As this study is not about selecting and analysing a wide range of 
decline-turnaround cases quantitatively, the example serves mainly as a reminder of the 
features that turnaround doesn’t exist without a decline, both of these can be ‘measured’ 
through changes in company performance (e.g. ROI) and that certain timeframes should 
be considered when calling a certain case as a decline-turnaround. 
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Figure 1: Indicative decline and turnaround criteria in terms of ROI development (based on Balgo-
bin & Pandit 2001, Pearce & Robbins 1992) 
 
2.1.2. Qualitative criteria for decline and turnaround 
As there isn’t a universally approved, unambiguous numeric definition for decline and 
turnaround, it is clear that additional descriptive features i.e. qualitative criteria are often 
preferred when discussing about this phenomenon. In fact, specific financial and per-
formance figures are mainly used just for screening purposes in quantitative studies (e.g. 
Hambrick & Schecter 1983, Pearce & Robbins 1992, Wiseman & Bromiley 1996). 
                                                 
1 Z = 1,2 x T1 + 1,4 x T2 + 3,3 x T3 + 0,6 x T4 + 0,999 x T5; 
Where: T1 = Working capital / Total assets, T2= Retained earnings / Total assets, T3= EBIT / Total assets, 
T4= Market value of equity / Book value of total liabilities, T5= Sales / Total assets 
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However, neither in qualitative terms is there a hard-and-fast definition for decline and 
turnaround, as Slatter & Lovett (1999, p. 1) put it. They continue by stating that a turna-
round situation is in hand when the “financial performance [of a company] indicates 
that the firm will fail in the foreseeable future unless short-term corrective action is tak-
en” (ibid, p. 1). This, however, determines only the moment when decline has already 
materialised and the company is in serious trouble. It doesn’t give any real insight in 
what the actual decline is and even more importantly, what determines if the corrective 
action taken in the turnaround situation really leads to a true turnaround and recovery. 
A common way to describe decline refers to a general reduction in organisation’s re-
source base (e.g. D’Aveni 1989, Cameron et al. 1988). According to D’Aveni (1989, p. 
578), the decline happens with respect to two critical resources: financial and manageri-
al (human resources). The indicators for reduction in financial resources are for example 
poor profitability, weak liquidity and low borrowing capacity (Altman 1968). This is 
supported by Hambrick & D’Aveni (1988), who claim that in addition to poor profita-
bility (i.e. performance) also deficient slack (i.e. lack of surplus resources in store for 
‘bad times’) is characterising the declining companies. Indicators of declining manage-
rial resources include decreasing numbers of prestigious top managers who add to the 
human capital of a firm (D’Aveni 1989, p. 578). 
Greenhalgh (1982) considers the resource base more broadly by including the reduc-
tions in e.g. workforce, assets, profits, physical capacity, and number or quality of in-
puts and outputs into definition of decline. This kind of thinking again somewhat disre-
gards the possibility of downsizing and rationalizing without problems in performance. 
Another difficulty with this approach is that drastic and noticeable diminishes in 
abovementioned size dimensions often follow after a prolonged decline, when it might 
already be too late to initiate a successful turnaround. (Weitzel & Jonsson 1989, p. 92) 
It seems plausible, that decline is strongly related to some sort of resource reduction 
and/or organisational downsizing. However, these reductions are more or less just con-
sequences of decline, and thus there is a need to further define the actual occurrence of 
decline. Weitzel & Jonsson (1989, p. 95) bring out an interesting addition to this by re-
minding that decline may also occur at the same time that organisational expansion and 
growth is taking place. Thus, it is sensible that solely decrease in certain resources can’t 
work as a watertight measure for decline.  
A popular view is that organisational decline is synonymous to inability to adapt to 
(changes in) circumstances and environment (e.g. Thompson 1967, Greenhalgh 1983, 
Levy 1986). This failure to adapt can be caused simply by a failure to recognize the im-
portant “warning signals” (Weitzel & Jonsson 1989, p. 94). One more feature stressed 
by Weitzel & Jonsson (1989) as well as e.g. Pajunen (2004, p. 76) is the threat that de-
cline sets to the long-term survival of an organisation. This is in line with the criteria 
presented in the previous chapter, according to which short term (less than 2-3 years) 
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and minor negative fluctuation in firm performance shouldn’t be considered as decline. 
Arogyaswamy et al. (1995, p. 497) stress the importance of this by saying, that threat to 
firm survival is actually the issue that makes a real decline conceptually distinct from 
firm stagnation. 
Even if the long-term survival of a company should be under threat in order to consider 
the situation as a real decline, it is important to notice that the phenomenon under re-
view here includes a turnaround. Thus, the ultimate negative outcomes of decline such 
as bankruptcy, breakdown and forced selling of the company e.g. in pieces as well as 
direct dissolution (Pajunen 2004, p. 77) are left for less consideration here. 
Whereas decline is obviously somewhat difficult to explicitly determine, turnaround can 
be quite simply described as a reversed performance decline (Arogyaswamy & Yasai-
Ardekani 1997, p. 3). Since decline – unless turned around – will ultimately lead to dis-
solution (Weitzel & Jonsson 1989), it could be argued that any existing organisation that 
has experienced a decline serves as an example of a turnaround. An important issue 
here, however, is the time scale of observation. Some declines might last for many years 
or even decades (depending on the actual definition used) so even if a company has ex-
perienced a decline but is still active doesn’t necessarily mean that a true turnaround has 
materialised. Especially organisations that have wealthy and strong owners and/or fi-
nanciers might perform poorly for ages and still manage to continue without any sort of 
dissolution. Slatter & Lovett (1999, p. 3) support this outlook when they mention that 
there is no absolute measure to differentiate between a mere survival and more sustain-
able turnaround, but that distinguishing these two from one another is essential.  
As it is important to understand that decline is more than just short-term negative fluc-
tuation in financial figures, it is as essential to pay attention to the sustainability of a 
possible recovery. Slatter & Lovett (1999) underline that true turnaround includes hav-
ing a viable and reasonable strategy, structured organisation and control, adequate prof-
itability and sustainable competitive advantage. With these criteria fulfilled, a company 
can be confident that it is unlikely to face another crisis in the foreseeable future (ibid.). 
As Hambrick & Schecter (1983, p. 235) point out, systematic criteria for decline and 
turnaround should be articulated even though they might not fit to all situations. A lot of 
decline and turnaround research has been made during the last 25 years, but as the pre-
vious chapters reveal, this hope of Hambrick & Schecter is still waiting to be realised. 
However, the lack of precise criteria does not mean the phenomenon itself wasn’t real 
and current at all times. To qualitatively sum up my approach, I consider decline in this 
report to be an existence-threatening deterioration in an organisational performance 
induced by maladaption to changes in environment. And what comes to the upturn 
phase, the turnaround means ensuring the continuing existence of an organisation 
through performance improvement and sustainable competitive advantage. 
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2.2. Decline and turnaround process as a continuum of 
transition zones 
Research on decline and turnaround has received creditable amount of attention since 
1970s, but it is evident that few of performed studies have focused on the whole com-
bined process of decline and turnaround (Balgobin & Pandit 2001, Pajunen 2004). Ex-
isting process descriptions and stage models focus largely on either decline or turna-
round, leaving combining examinations to a lesser notice. Surely, as mentioned earlier, 
some sort of decline is a prerequisite for the whole turnaround to even be possible, and 
thus the existing turnaround stage models include decline (or crisis / failure etc.) as a 
part of a turnaround process (Balgobin & Pandit 2001, Chowdury 2002). However, it is 
obvious that a decline itself is a complicated process (Weitzel & Jonsson 1989, Ham-
brick & D’Aveni 1988), so covering it just as a simple part of a turnaround may some-
what undermine its significance. 
A compilation of existing process and stage studies is presented in the following sub-
chapters in order to produce a picture of the ‘zones’ included in decline and turnaround 
as well as the transitions between them. 
 
2.2.1. Decline as a downward spiral 
It has already become clear, that decline in a way is the first stage of a corporate turna-
round. However, determining a starting point for a decline is difficult to say the least – 
if not impossible. First, it is not unambiguous which reasons related to decline (e.g. 
management errors, poor quality, failed projects) are actually the root causes and not 
consequences emerging during the decline (Pajunen 2004, pp. 79-80). Secondly, as ex-
plained above, there isn’t a common understanding of when a company is in real de-
cline. Does it require three successive years of declining ROI to make a decline state-
ment, and if so, then when has the actual decline initiated? 
Weitzel & Jonsson (1989, p. 94) claim that “decline begins when an organization fails 
to anticipate or recognize and effectively respond to any deterioration of organizational 
performance that threatens long-term survival”. This is in line with a sensible reasoning, 
that decline doesn’t strike or commence at an exact measurable moment, but it rather 
gradually develops in time as an organisation fails to handle its deteriorating perfor-
mance. Weitzel & Jonsson (1989, p. 98) also point out that weakening performance and 
failure to react to it can’t be noticed from financial reports while in the early staged of 
decline. These early negative changes are rather qualitative and thus more difficult to 
notice (ibid.). Anticipating and/or recognizing the occurring decline is further compli-
cated by the theory that an emerging decline is expected to divert mangers’ attention 
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away from the locus of the action, as the “noice” created by the crisis prevents managers 
from considering relevant information (Mellahi et al. 2002, p. 17). All in all, it can be 
said that decline is a result of a case-specific combination of external and internal fac-
tors that have negative effects on firm performance (e.g. Pajunen 2004, Mellahi et al. 
2002, Barker & Barr 2002). However, companies face these kinds of challenges all the 
time in different phases of life-cycle without sinking to a true decline. Thus, it is argua-
ble to accept the view of Weitzel & Jonsson (1989) according to which a decline pro-
cess truly begins with a blinded stage where organisation fails to anticipate and detect 
the threatening pressure toward entropy (ibid. p. 97). 
In the second stage of the Weitzel & Jonsson (1989) model the company and its manag-
ers have noticed the degenerating problems mainly because these are starting to show in 
quantitative form like decreasing sales and profitability or e.g. surplus inventories. 
However, as decline is yet to reach a crisis at this stage, the company does not do any-
thing meaningful to halt the negative trend, but rather continues as if everything was 
going fine. Thus, this second stage of decline process is called inaction by Weitzel & 
Jonsson (1989). This stage is said to be more emphatic and last longer for larger and 
older organisations, which is in line with a popular view that small firms are more active 
and faster in initiating competitive moves than large firms (e.g. Hambrick et al. 1996). 
Another factor influencing the duration of this stage is the management’s conception of 
the root causes behind decline. If the downturn is seen to be caused by external factors, 
such as economic recession or raw material prices, then the company is likely to contin-
ue executing its current strategy with the focus on efficiency improvements. On the con-
trary, if the management ‘takes the blame’ and realises the internal factors behind de-
cline, then they are likely to focus their efforts toward more concrete changes in strategy 
and operations. (Barker & Barr, 2002) One more element nurturing the inaction is the 
management’s habit to rely on well-rehearsed rather than less familiar responses when 
facing a situation of failure (Staw et al. 1981). 
While it can be lethal for an organisation to stay in the inaction stage for too long, 
equally dangerous consequences might arise if the actions are taken too impulsively re-
sulting in reckless and careless decisions. These kinds of faulty actions are characteris-
ing the third stage of decline according to Weitzel & Jonsson (1989). They continue by 
stating that this stage in a way may be the best time to plan and implement major reor-
ganisation activities such as introducing new leadership, diversification through acquisi-
tions and/or R&D, and divestiture of failing assets (ibid. p. 104, Schendel et al. 1976). 
These all are actions that occur constantly in turnaround literature when listing instruc-
tions for initiating successful recovery (e.g. Hambrick & Schecter 1983, Arogyaswamy 
et al. 1995, Bibeault 1998, Morrow et al. 2004, Gopinath 2005). Thus, it can be argued 
that this third stage of decline is pretty much a turning point if a company is to perform 
a successful turnaround. Of course this turnaround is possible all the way until dissolu-
tion (Pajunen 2004, p. 78), but the abovementioned reorganisation actions (also known 
as retrenchment) are such a vital part in a turnaround process (as later described), that 
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deepening the decline with drastic faulty actions can lead to a point of no return en-
route to a bankruptcy. 
Fourth stage by Weitzel & Jonsson (1989) is simply called as crisis, which pretty much 
defines itself. At this point an organisation is suffering from e.g. lack of personnel moti-
vation, high level of conflicts, secrecy, problems in operational models and serious 
management and leadership deficiencies on top of the continuing financial pressure. In 
this context, the crisis stage isn’t a result of some acute event or incident, but rather a 
chronic spiral of unfavourable issues. (Ranki 2000, Cameron et al. 1987) The crisis 
management itself is a well-researched topic (see e.g. Pearson & Clair 1998), but it of-
ten treats crisis as an extraordinary and surprising occurrence like for example environ-
mental shock or terrorist attack. As a part of decline process, crisis can simply be under-
stood as a last ‘layer’ before sinking into dissolution. It can become suddenly after short 
blinded stage or result from long lasting performance deterioration with many faulty 
actions preceding. However, it is characterized by multiplied and complex internal 
problems requiring major and even revolutionary reorganisation if to be turned around. 
(Weitzel & Jonsson 1989, Pajunen 2004)  
Weitzel & Jonsson (1989) stage model of decline finishes in the dissolution stage, when 
a company has no further possibilities to continue its turnaround efforts due to serious 
problems resulting in capital depletion. However, when discussing about (successful) 
turnaround cases, this 5th stage can’t be included into process anymore. 
It is obvious, that no two decline cases follow the exact same kind of process, as timing 
and nature of different stages can vary significantly. For example, Hambrick & D’Aveni 
(1988) claim that certain seeds of weakness can be seen already 10 years before eventu-
al bankruptcy, whereas Hoffman (1989) found that average decline lasted 2.8 years (no-
tice the problem of defining a starting point for a decline). In addition to varying timing, 
the stages may notably overlap and form an iterative process. Hambrick & D’Aveni 
(1988, pp. 13-16) mention inaction as a possible key stage in decline (between 3 and 6 
years prior bankruptcy), but they claim that another possibility at this time of decline 
can as well be the exact opposite – hyperaction (related to faulty actions in Weitzel & 
Jonsson’s model), thus combining two stages of Weitzel & Jonsson (1989) model under 
one with a label of extreme strategic behaviour (that includes both inaction and hyper-
action). 
No matter what kind of stages the actual decline follows, it is widely accepted that or-
ganisational failure is a protracted process where one weakness leads to another and the 
company falls into a spiral of decline (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988, p. 13). Even if it is 
impossible to construct a universal process model to cover all the various decline types, 
it is well-founded to have certain stages recognised and described. For example, by dis-
tinguishing between stages, particular problems associated with specific stages of de-
cline can be identified in order to develop better turnaround strategies (Weitzel & Jons-
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son 1989, p. 107). Recognising certain contingencies like the nature of firm’s decline 
process can heavily influence e.g. the most suitable strategies for recovery (Arog-
yaswamy et al. 1995). These developed process descriptions also help in understanding 
the concept of decline by creating a terminology of possible stages, features and dynam-
ics of decline (Pajunen 2004). 
 
2.2.2. A gradual transition from decline to turnaround 
It is rather commonly agreed that an entity of turnaround broadly includes an initial de-
cline (from which to recover), stabilisation phase (retrenchment) and the actual recov-
ery. However, these stages aren’t distinct periods with clear transitions from one to an-
other, but rather they exist simultaneously with different features being emphasized in 
different moments (and thus providing a chance to distinguish certain vaguely separated 
stages from the process). All in all, it can be justified to observe the transition from de-
cline to actual turnaround as a separate item in the process, as the overlap and interac-
tion of different stages, features and ‘forces’ is at its most intense in this phase (Pajunen 
2004, p. 82). 
Like mentioned earlier, the decline process is likely to begin with a blinded stage as a 
company and its management don’t notice the problems caused by changes in environ-
ment or other factors (Weitzel & Jonsson 1989). This phase is often followed by inac-
tion, but at this stage the company has at least realised that things are going somewhat 
wrong. Thus, it can be argued, that the transition to turnaround initiates here, even 
though concrete actions and results may be far ahead. Pajunen (2004, pp. 86-87) sees 
this period as a line between first and second zone in his model of decline and turna-
round process. Forces of decline – both initial causes and emerged side-effects – are still 
pushing the company down in its decline, but gradually appearing awareness of the situ-
ation as the first force of possible turnaround is initiating the upturn stage that conse-
quently overlaps with the decline process (ibid.). 
Gathered from different stage models, this gradual transition from decline to turnaround 
resembles e.g. response initiation phase in Chowdury (2002), triggers for change and 
recovery strategy formulation phases in Balgobin & Pandit (2001) and early part of de-
cline stemming activities in Arogyaswamy et al. (1995). What has to be stressed though 
is that the importance of fitting certain stages of existing models to this period in decline 
and turnaround is insignificant. Important is to realise that the transition from decline to 
turnaround doesn’t happen overnight, as it doesn’t do between any other two stages or 
zones either. Once the triggers for change have been launched, the still on-going decline 
process gets a rivalling counterforce to compete with it. These launches may happen 
early in the decline process if the company is well aware of its environment, but perhaps 
more commonly it requires some sort of a crisis to stimulate new thought and initiatives 
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(Balgobin & Pandit 2001, p. 303). Naturally the earlier the company realises it is in de-
cline and thus initiates the transition (which of course might still fail), the better the 
chances are that a true turnaround is eventually achieved (e.g. Weitzel & Jonsson 1989). 
However, even this recognition of the decline isn’t necessarily a simple one time event, 
as Gopinath (2005, p. 23) defines the recognition to include “awareness of a crisis aris-
ing from the decline”, “realisation that the crisis will not be resolved by continuing the 
present course of action” and “matching corrective action to the true (real) causes of the 
crisis”. 
Including recovery strategy formulation to this vague transition phase instead of the ac-
tual turnaround period might first sound incorrect, but as the third part of Gopinath’s 
(2005) recognition definition tells, certain plans about corrective actions taking the de-
cline contingencies into an account must be made in order to say that a company has 
initiated its turnaround attempt. Arogyaswamy et al. (1995) stress that certain plans and 
decisions about longer term recovery strategies must be made before launching any 
‘fire-fighting’ retrenchment activities. This sounds reasonable, as too rash implementa-
tion of cutbacks and lay-offs may turn out as major a mistake and falsely directed if rig-
orous analysis and plan for recovery strategy have not been performed prior. In a way 
this implies that certain inaction can be a lot healthier than irrational hyperaction lead-
ing to faulty actions (see Weitzel & Jonsson 1989; Hambrick & D’Aveni 1988) as long 
as this inaction doesn’t apply to analysis and planning work. 
In summary it could be said, that this blurry transition phase between decline and turna-
round is in a way just an amendment in the mindset of a company and its management. 
Concrete actions and results are still waiting to be realised as the decline forces are 
causing the performance to deteriorate further and further. However, at this point the 
company is somewhat aware of its situation, accepts that changes need to be made and 
is on its way in reasoning how to proceed. 
 
2.2.3. Stabilisation and recovery as stages in turnaround 
It is widely agreed in literature, that turning company around from a decline requires 
twofold approach – stabilisation activities to ‘stop the bleeding’ followed by recovery 
strategy implementation supporting the sustainable performance improvement. Howev-
er, there isn’t equal consensus about the terms used to define these two stages. Pearce & 
Robbins (1992, 1993, 1994) use terms retrenchment and recovery as do Barker & Mone 
(1994), even though these two duos disagree quite strongly on the roles of abovemen-
tioned stages. Hoffman (1989) for one sees retrenchment as improving the way compa-
ny conducts business, whereas recovery focuses on shaping the type of business con-
ducted by the company. This is nicely in line with the view of Hofer (1980), who uses 
terms operative and strategic turnaround as differing ways of conducting a firm upturn.  
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Some researchers avoid using term retrenchment, as it strongly refers to downsizing. 
Naturally declining companies have to enhance efficiency and this normally means get-
ting rid of non-performing assets, resources and/or businesses. However, in some cases 
the needed retrenchment activities may be minimal and overshadowed by other forms of 
stabilisation such as renewing the stakeholder support and improving the internal cli-
mate and decision processes of an organisation. (Arogyaswamy et al. 1995) Probably 
the main contingency behind the need for retrenchment and downsizing is the level of 
slack at the time of turnaround attempt (ibid. p. 504). This slack (i.e. surplus recourses 
in store for ‘bad times’) can help a company to implement recovery strategies without 
asset reductions as there is no need for immediate cash generation. On the other hand, 
though, ‘the safety net’ provided by these surplus resources (especially financial re-
sources) can give room for complacency and thus cause inadequate adaptive initiatives 
– i.e. ‘success breeds failure’ (Gopinath 2005, Hambrick & D’Aveni 1988). 
Pearce & Robbins (1992) claim that turnaround efforts almost always entail cutback, 
downsizing and cost reduction and thus term retrenchment would be an appropriate de-
scription for this decline stemming phase. In this study, though, I use term stabilisation 
when referring to this phase, as it both includes the almost necessary asset / cost reduc-
tions and other features and actions when trying to stop the downturn. Pajunen (2004, p. 
82) mentions that all these presented terms could be considered as interchangeable (he 
chooses the term retrenchment), and even if this is obviously quite true, I prefer word 
stabilisation, which – if not offering any other value – at least takes into account a rare 
but existing possibility of diversification and increasing resources already while stem-
ming decline (Chowdury 2002, p. 254). 
As mentioned above, even if there are different opinions about the importance and ter-
minology of turnaround phases, it is quite well accepted that two somewhat distinct 
stages can be recognised. The second one, recovery (or return to growth), refers to 
events and actions that are more strategic and longer term focused than immediate de-
cline stemming procedures (Pearce & Robbins 1992, Barker & Mone 1994, Arog-
yaswamy et al. 1995, Balgobin & Pandit 2001). In fact, it is quite impossible to deter-
mine when recovery phase and thus the whole turnaround ends, as companies have to 
continuously think their strategic decisions in order to succeed – also during the so-
called good times. So basically, this recovery strategy and its implementation is nothing 
different from normal strategy work, except that continuing with previous model is 
somewhat ruled out as an option. Pearce & Robbins (2008) present a choice of three 
broad alternatives for post-decline strategy: rebuilding the company on its prior foot-
print (i.e. minor restructuring), competing with more restricted scope than before (i.e. 
major retrenchment and efficiency improvement) and as a third option, going through a 
complete strategic transformation (i.e. new businesses, diversification, acquisitions etc.).  
It is clear, that dividing turnaround to just two stages doesn’t represent a true process 
description, as in real life the turnaround attempts are much more complicated chains of 
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events. Some efforts have been made in order to enlighten the turnaround process more 
specifically (e.g. Arogyaswamu et al. 1995, Balgobin & Pandit 2001, Chowdury 2002, 
Pajunen 2004), but it doesn’t seem that any of these would have gained as widely ac-
cepted reception as for example Weitzel & Jonsson’s (1989) decline process study. 
Probably the most important contribution of these process description attempts is that 
they stress the importance of understanding the iterative and inter-related nature of dif-
ferent events in turnaround. While there are findings like Bibeault’s (1982), that a clear 
decision point exists between retrenchment and recovery actions, it has more commonly 
been pointed out that these two stages and activities within them are normally at least 
somewhat overlapping (e.g. Pearce & Robbins 1992, Chowdury 2002). 
 
2.2.4. Compilation of different process and stage models 
The process of decline and turnaround has been described in the previous sub-chapters 
on the basis of existing research and literature. There are naturally additional opinions 
and findings concerning this chain of events that have not been mentioned in this study. 
However, as the process is obviously very case sensitive and complicated, it serves here 
just to present the main parts that have been drawn upon in previous research. Thus, we 
now have a framework for the concept of decline and turnaround process with the main 
terminology and a descriptive flow of events discussed. What comes to the actual defi-
nition of a process, Van de Ven & Poole (1995) defined it e.g. “as a sequence of events 
describing how things change over time and why they change this way”. The latter 
question – why things change – is discussed more deeply in chapter four, where the ac-
tual company actions and contingencies affecting them are presented. A compilation of 
previously presented process structures is represented in Figure 2, with the company 
performance as an indicator of transitions between different stages (see also Figure 1). 
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Figure 2: Main stages in decline and turnaround process (mainly based on Weitzel & Jonsson 1989, 
Balgobin & Pandit 2001, Pearce & Robbins 1992) 
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The initial decline in company performance (described with red dash line) happens 
when performance level starts to drop even if company doesn’t realise it and this leads 
to inaction. As Weitzel & Jonsson’s (1989) model of decline process tells, the decline is 
to continue if company rushes to faulty actions and further the situation develops to a 
crisis. The decline (if not turned around) leads to an eventual dissolution, which is the 
last step in this failure process (described with red dotted line).  
The five-step area in the middle of Figure 2 shows a process of successful turnaround 
according to Balgobin & Pandit (2001). Whereas in continuing decline process the 
company suffers from faulty actions, in turnaround (described with blue line) the com-
pany realises that things are wrong (triggers for change) and starts to develop a recovery 
strategy (grey area). As Arogyaswamy et al. (1995) stress, it is important to have the 
long-term recovery strategies outlined before any major retrenchment and / or stabilisa-
tion actions are implemented, so that those support one another and aim to a common 
vision. Once the future competitive areas and main focus have been defined, it is time to 
stop the declining performance and stabilise the internal environment as well as rela-
tionships to other stakeholders. These actions often involve retrenchment and downsiz-
ing, but quick fix results i.e. performance improvement doesn’t usually follow immedi-
ately. Thus, return to growth must be considered as long-term engagement. As Chow-
dyry (2002, p. 256) points out, “performance improvement should stretch over a long 
period of time to allow for recovery, lest firms be prematurely considered successful or 
unsuccessful”. To sum up the difference between stages in turnaround (green area), sta-
bilisation aims at reversing the negative consequences of decline, while recovery strate-
gy and its implementation should address the causes of decline (e.g. Pajunen 2004, p. 
83) 
The topmost area of decline, transition, stabilisation and recovery represents the broad 
theoretical conception of decline and turnaround process as interpreted in this study. Its 
colour scheme shows its linkage to model presented by Balgobin & Pandit (2001). The 
main idea of this conception is that the stages are strongly linked to one another and 
thus overlap creating an inter-related nature. For example, the forces of decline continue 
to hinder turnaround attempt even when the stabilisation is on its way. Also, the line 
between stabilisation and longer-term recovery is rather vague, as e.g. similar actions 
may be used in both stages. The sloping lines between stages are illustrating these inter-
connections and overlaps, as more than one stage can be represented in certain point of 
performance curve. 
Even with these overlaps described, it has to be mentioned that the stages and perfor-
mance curve represent just an example of the whole process. For example, a successful 
turnaround can be initiated even as late as crisis stage of decline, moving the two turna-
round areas right relative to the decline process. Also, the time variable (horizontal axis) 
should be considered rather unstructured, as e.g. a blinded stage may well last longer 
than for example stabilisation stage, even if they have certain lengths in the Figure 2. 
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3. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS EXPLAINING THE 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF COMPANIES 
3.1. Corporate strategy, competitive advantage and over-
all performance 
The concept of decline and turnaround has been discussed in the earlier chapter, with 
criteria, terminology and process descriptions presented based on existing literature. 
However, the actual reasons for declining performance and company actions leading to 
a consequent turnaround have not been addressed yet. Various decline forces (i.e. rea-
sons for decline) and possible stabilisation and recovery responses (i.e. turnaround 
methods) are discussed further in chapter four, with the focus on internal decisions and 
actions that can be implemented in order to succeed in turnaround. However, it is the 
external environment – namely market environment – where the customers lie, so it is 
how a company acts and succeeds in this competition that eventually decides between 
success and failure (Ferrier et al. 1999).  
Therefore, before addressing the actual turnaround and possible retrenchment strategies 
derived from decline and turnaround literature, I focus on competitive dynamics as an 
imperative element behind firm performance. With the main theories of competitive dy-
namics discussed here, I can later analyse the competitive actions within Finnish con-
sumer goods retail trade and their interconnection with the decline and turnaround of S-
Group. It has to be noted though, that drawing a line between pure competitive actions 
and other more internal actions can be difficult, as this is not well agreed issue in exist-
ing literature. For example, Ferrier et al. (1999) consider only market-based actions as 
competitive ones (thus excluding e.g. R&D initiatives), whereas Chen et al. (2002), for 
instance, claim that any intentional action with an aim of improving competitive posi-
tion should be seen as a competitive action. (See also Nokelainen 2008, pp. 59-63) 
As has been previously outlined, the main broad variable in a decline and turnaround 
process is the performance level of a company. On the other hand, the main purpose of 
business activity in general is to fulfil stakeholders’ goals, including performing (in fi-
nancial terms) above certain desirable level (Nokelainen 2008, pp. 55-56). Again, per-
forming well requires succeeding in the competition with other market players, as mo-
nopolistic business environments are rare in modern societies of market economy (this 
not being the case either in Finnish consumer goods retail trade). Outperforming com-
petitors and thus creating superior economic value requires having competitive ad-
vantage(s), and thus seeking of these can be seen as the main object of corporate strate-
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gy. Eventually, according to this view, strategy as a concept can be addressed as a “the-
ory how to gain competitive advantages” (Barney & Hesterly 2006, p. 5). 
Even if there is some argument over the definition of a competitive action, it is well 
agreed that intentionality is a prerequisite for such an action. This leads from the views 
of Austrian school of economics, which is largely seen as the theoretical premise for the 
whole concept of competitive dynamics. (see Jacobson 1992) Thus the competitive ac-
tions can be seen as representing corporate strategy, since they aren’t any coincidental 
events but planned and purposeful actions with objective of attaining competitive ad-
vantages and thus desirable performance level (e.g. Mintzberg 1978). Other way round, 
the desire for competitive advantage can be seen as the driver for competitive actions 
(Chen et al. 1992, p. 439). With these aspects considered, it can be argued that there is a 
direct link between competitive actions made by firm and its eventual performance 
(Hambrick et al. 1996). And as the whole decline and turnaround phenomenon is about 
firm performance, it is evident that competitive actions (and thus competitive dynamics) 
represent a relevant dimension in studying decline and turnaround cases. 
Competitive action(s)
Strategy Competitive advantage Firm performance
Decline
Turnaround
(Are / represent)
(Seeks / enables)
(Driver for)
(Enables)
(Deterioration)
(Improvement)
(Requires sustainable)
 
Figure 3: Linkage between competitive actions (dynamics) and decline and turnaround. (based on 
Nokelainen 2008, p. 57) 
The concept of competitive advantage is broad, with most definitions using value-
creation, better than competitors and not imitated as key features describing this ability 
to capture superior value to rival firms (e.g. Barney 1991, Hitt et al. 2005, Grant 2005). 
A famous theory related to (how to capture and maintain) competitive advantage is re-
source-based view (see e.g. Peteraf 1993), according to which a firm’s resources repre-
sent the ability to have competitive advantage(s). So that competitive advantages can 
exist and be maintained (i.e. to have sustainable competitive advantage), resources must 
be distributed heterogeneously across firms and they must not be perfectly mobile. This 
means that competitors aren’t necessarily sharing equal resources and that this hetero-
geneous state can be somewhat enduring, i.e. not all the resources can be acquired in 
factor markets. (Barney 1991) In this kind of environment, a company should possess 
resources that fit four conditions – value, rarity, difficult to imitate and non-
substitutability – in order to capture and keep competitive advantage over rivalry firms 
(e.g. Barney 1991, Bates & Flynn 1995, Litz 1996, Bowen & Wiersema 1999). 
It can be argued, that this resource-based view is somewhat conflicting with theories 
that emphasize external competition. For example Priem & Butler (2001, p. 23) mention 
that “the publication of Porter's (1980) Competitive Strategy shifted the emphasis to-
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ward external competitive issues and that both strategy scholars and managers often fail 
to recognize that resource base, rather than the particular product market combination 
chosen for its deployment, lies at the heart of their firm's competitive position.” The 
meaning of this study is not to argue between these theories, but as I have just presented 
the link between competitive actions (dynamics) and decline and turnaround, it is rea-
sonable to bring up the connection with the resource-based view as well. 
As was mentioned earlier, decline is often associated with some sort of reduction in 
firm’s resource base (e.g. D’Aveni 1989, Cameron et al. 1988). However, as Weitzel & 
Jonsson (1989) mention, noticeable decrease in strategic resources may not occur until 
prolonged performance downturn and thus this resource base deterioration is more or 
less just a consequence of a decline. Unintentional resource reductions may include e.g. 
weakening management as talented professionals leave a company when its internal 
climate starts to decay. Naturally the financial resources are also affected as perfor-
mance decline erodes profitability. In addition to these reductions, a decline and turna-
round process often leads to some intentional resource divestments (i.e. retrenchment) 
as well. Unprofitable assets may be sold and personnel layoffs carried out in order to 
enhance efficiency and generate cash flow. (e.g. Kose et al. 1992)  
These aspects concerned, it can be argued that, in terms of resource-based view, the de-
cline is much a downward spiral where certain resource reductions lead to further cut-
offs. However, as the potential for competitive advantage should be retained and ex-
ploited in order to perform a turnaround, it is imperative that a company doesn’t lose its 
strategic ‘backbone’ resources that enable core competencies and thus competitive ad-
vantage (see Prahalad & Hamel 1990). This view supports the thoughts of Arogyaswa-
my et al. (1995), who claim that that certain plans and decisions about longer term re-
covery strategies must be made before launching any ‘fire-fighting’ retrenchment activi-
ties. On the other way round, if asset divestitures were implemented without vision of a 
long-term recovery strategy, valuable resources in terms of future competitive ad-
vantage could be lost. 
According to abovementioned, competitive advantage is attained through (successful) 
competitive actions and / or valuable resource base. And as declining firm is suffering 
from poor performance, it is obvious that it is lacking competitive advantage(s). Thus, a 
decline and turnaround case can be examined from both of these viewpoints: (i) the (dy-
namics in) competitive actions that it has performed, and, (ii) the dynamics in its strate-
gic resource base. However, as these two are indeed closely interlinked (e.g. investing 
in a new plant can be a competitive action while being a concrete resource-based move), 
there is no need to draw any barriers between them. Following in this study, the compet-
itive (more external) environment is discussed in this chapter, while (more internal) re-
source-based issues are touched upon in chapter four. 
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3.2. From competitive actions to competitive dynamics 
Competitive actions are performed in order to create competitive advantage(s) in the 
competitive environment where a firm must succeed in order to perform according to its 
objectives. While the actual issue under review in this part is called competitive dynam-
ics, i.e. “how competitors actually interact in the marketplace via the ongoing exchange 
of competitive moves.” (Chen et al. 1992, pp. 439-440), it is first important to under-
stand what are the actions that, when interchanged, lead to competitive dynamics.  
 
3.2.1. Competitive action 
As was mentioned earlier, there are several differing opinions about what really is a 
competitive action. As a part of his dissertation, Nokelainen (2008) presents an exhaus-
tive collection and analysis of these numerous concept definitions, which largely agree 
on the intentional nature of competitive action, but are not so unanimous when it comes 
to the detectability or direction of these kinds of moves. 
From the 14 definitions2 for competitive action (or response) described by Nokelainen 
(2008, pp. 22-23), pretty much all imply that competitive actions are done for purpose – 
and are thus intentional. This intentionality means, in short, that there is a proper action 
plan, the action is performed at the intended time, the performed action follows the ini-
tial plan, there is a reasonable chance to succeed in the action, and finally, that the actor 
has a some control over the success of the action (Mele & Moser 1994). Basically, this 
condition is just ruling out ‘accidental’ and / or ‘stroke of luck’ moves from being con-
sidered as competitive actions. 
While it is rather universally agreed that competitive actions are intentional occurrences, 
it is far more complicated to conclude if competitive actions should be delimited in 
terms of their ‘direction’ (i.e. internal / external / market oriented) and detectability 
(Nokelainen 2008, pp. 59-66). Some researchers (e.g. Miller & Chen 1994, Ferrier et al. 
1999) count only market-based moves as competitive ones, and in a way, this makes 
sense as the way a firm acts and responds in a market is said to determine its ultimate 
organizational performance (Porter 1980). On the other corner are the scholars like 
Chen et al. (2002) and Barney & Hesterly (2006), who claim that the roots of competi-
tive advantage i.e. competitive actions are any moves that can enhance firm’s competi-
tive position regardless of their direction. The ‘more internal’ moves could include for 
example investing in product development (Helfat & Raubitschek 2000) or human rela-
                                                 
2 Smith et al (1991), Smith et al. (1992), Miller & Chen (1994), Chen & Hambrick (1995), Baum & Korn 
(1996), Miller & Chen (1996a), (1996b), Ferrier et al. (1999), Ferrier (2001), Chen et al. (2002) 
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tions management (Koch & McGrath 1996), which don’t probably have direct effect on 
competitive position of a firm, but may be sources for major advantages in long term. 
Another issue under debate – detectability of a competitive action – is pretty much re-
lated to the direction matter. It is not only if a certain move is detectable or not, but ra-
ther the question is if this move is detected by company itself or some other stakeholder 
external to the firm (Nokelainen 2008, p. 64). Nokelainen (2008) continues by stating 
that as a competitive action is intentionally performed, it is obviously detectable by a 
company itself. Thus, it only remains to specify if an action has to be detected outside 
an organisation in order to make a call that this move is a competitive action. The link-
age to the direction matter is here – naturally, if an action is market-based (i.e. per-
formed on the market), it is rather detectable to almost any public entity outside an or-
ganisation. On the other hand, if the nature of an action is internal, it may even be im-
possible for an external observer to notice any move. 
As a result of his conceptual analysis and development, Nokelainen (2008) ends up in 
not excluding internally directed and / or externally undetectable actions from being 
competitive ones. The main idea behind this reasoning is neatly based on competitive 
advantage – the motive behind (competitive) actions. As already has been mentioned (as 
a part of resource-based view), competitive advantage may result from internal issues or 
at least from combination of moves which include internally directed actions (e.g. 
strengthening intangible resources) (Hall 1993). Therefore, excluding internally directed 
actions would result in “prohibiting companies to use certain kinds of actions as com-
petitive actions in their pursuit of gaining and maintaining competitive advantage” (No-
kelainen 2008, p. 63). What comes to the detectability, it is well agreed (e.g. Chen et al. 
1992, Chen 1996, Hopkins 2003), that a competitive advantage has more chances of be-
ing successful and sustainable if the competing responses to it are few in number and 
slow. Thus, the more difficult it is for competitors to detect actions leading to competi-
tive advantage, the better are the chances that the initiator will gain superior head start. 
Consequently, the undetectable actions are not only competitive ones, but rather effi-
cient ones as well (Nokelainen 2008, p. 65). 
As a part of this case study, I will consider competitive action mainly according to the 
view of Chen & Hambrick (1995, p. 456), i.e. as a specific and detectable competitive 
move initiated by a firm in order to acquire its rivals' market shares or reducing their 
anticipated returns, or in general to defend or improve its competitive advantage vis-à-
vis its competitors (i.e. competitive position). And as the more internal strategies, re-
sources and actions are covered later in this study; I add a feature of externally directed 
to my approach (according to e.g. Ferrier 2001). These kinds of actions are rather direct-
ly affecting the competitive environment and largely detectable for competitors and oth-
er external observers. According to the view of Nokelainen (2008), these actions may 
represent only a subset of all competitive actions, but, as acknowledged by himself, in 
practice it can be reasonable to focus only on certain types of actions (ibid. p. 63). 
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3.2.2. Actions and responses constituting the dynamics 
Companies that successfully perform initiative moves (i.e. competitive actions) will 
consequently seize opportunities and thus generate above normal returns (Nelson & 
Winter 1982). However, such innovations – or entrepreneurial discoveries according to 
Austrian economics (e.g. Jacobson 1992) – are likely to be imitated by competitors, and 
as this exchange of actions cumulates, it results in a dynamic, constantly changing com-
petitive market (ibid., Schumpeter 1934). The Austrian school stresses that accepting 
this disequilibrium and constant competition is focal, and therefore a company can be 
successful only through constant discovery and innovativeness. Thus, this Austrian 
view differs largely from the Industrial Organisation –based thinking, which concen-
trates on restricting competitive forces and creating ‘monopoly power’. (Jacobson 1992) 
There are some characteristics related to competitive dynamics that are useful to analyse 
in addition to the actual nature or meaning of specific moves. First thing is naturally the 
‘order of entry’, i.e. which company executes the so-called initiative action. There are 
somewhat disagreeing views on if it is recommendable, on average, to be a pioneer or a 
follower, although it is obvious that no universal guideline could even exist. However, 
e.g. Teece (1987) comments that often imitators (i.e. followers) can generate bigger 
profits from a specific innovation, as for example their development costs of a new 
product can be drastically lower than those of the pioneer. On the other hand, Kerin et 
al. (1992, p. 33) mention that order of entry is causally related to market share, as, on 
average, the first movers have higher market shares that the followers. It has to be 
stressed though, that the performance indicators employed above – namely profitability 
and market share – don’t necessarily go hand in hand, and thus both suppositions can be 
true at the same time.  
One factor affecting the attractiveness of being either a pioneer or a follower has to do 
with a variable called response lag. As was mentioned earlier, a competitive advantage 
has more chances of being successful and sustainable if the competing responses to it 
are few in number and slow (e.g. Chen et al. 1992, Chen 1996, Hopkins 2003). Accord-
ingly, the longer the response lag, the longer the initiator can enjoy of its ‘monopoly 
status’ and reap the economic benefits of its action (Chen et al. 1992, p. 442). The issue 
of response lag is therefore strongly related to the detectability of a competitive action – 
the harder it is for possible imitators to detect the move, the longer the response lag. 
Additionally, in case of competitive environments of more than two actors, the number 
and order of responses are also affecting the dynamics (Smith et al. 1991). 
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3.2.3. Variety of competitive actions 
I have now discussed the interrelation between competitive actions, competitive ad-
vantage and firm performance. Further, the existing definitions of what is competitive 
action and how these actions, when ‘exchanged’ in market, make up competitive dy-
namics, are also covered. However, all this approach has been rather theoretical, and in 
order to build some grounds for the analysis of actual competitive actions used by the 
case example, it is reasonable to present here some concrete moves that constitute a 
‘repertoire of options’ from which to choose when involved in competitive dynamics. 
Of course, the criteria used in deciding which moves are competitive actions – i.e. direc-
tion and detectability questions – affect the extent of this repertoire. 
Many of the existing studies presenting accounts of different competitive actions are 
focused on U.S. domestic airline industry (e.g. Smith et al. 1991, Chen et al. 1992, Chen 
& Hambrick 1995). According to Hambrick et al. (1996, pp. 659-660) these studies 
form a kind of a program with three highly related streams: The first one focuses on 
pure competitive dynamics, i.e. the action / response –dyad. The second stream investi-
gates strategic competitive behaviour at the firm level, e.g. how information processing 
manners of a firm influence its competitive responses (Smith et al. 1991). The third 
stream, respectively, aims at conceptualizing a firm's strategy as the entire repertoire of 
its competitive moves (e.g. Miller & Chen 1994). Most of the studies in this ‘program’ 
base their empirical data on Aviation Daily, an industry-specific publication (Noke-
lainen 2008, p. 71), while the foundation for categorising competitive actions, if there is 
one, is in most of the cases Levine (1987). And while aviation industry serves as a good 
environment to study competitive dynamics, it is also notable that such concentrated 
standpoint doesn’t give the best possible view of the general repertoires of competitive 
actions across industries. For example “new hub creations” (Smith et al. 1991) and 
“route entry” (Chen & Hambrick 1995) are competitive actions that can only be imple-
mented in this particular industry (and maybe some other logistics / transportation relat-
ed fields), and thus having this ‘U.S. domestic airline industry’ –program as the only 
basis for analysing possible repertoires of competitive actions may not work that well in 
other environments. 
To add perspective, studies from other industries are also included in analysing existing 
accounts concerning varieties of competitive actions. A couple studies around the mil-
lennium focused, not surprisingly, on software (Young et al. 1996, 2000) and internet 
related industries (Kotha et al. 2001). Further, Boyd & Bresser (2004) have studied and 
categorised competitive actions in American retail industry. Ferrier (e.g. 2001, Ferrier et 
al. 1999, 2002) has categorised competitive actions in multi-industry studies and has 
thus contributed to creating accounts of industry-invariant actions. Finally, Offstein & 
Gnyawali (2005) differ notably from other categorisations, by having as many as 69 
types of action (other studies have between 2 and 21 types) based on joint research ef-
fort with practicing managers in the U.S pharmaceutical industry. 
  31
Common aspect in all these studies, even if focused on differing industries and 
‘streams’, is that they employ some sort of categorisation of competitive actions in em-
pirical analyses. I am not going to present or analyse further any particular accounts, but 
rather concentrate on building a synthesis out of them in order to have a preliminary 
‘menu’, i.e. a repertoire of possible actions from which a company can, in theory, 
choose its preferred moves in each competitive situation. The benefit of having this kind 
of list is, in practice, the help it provides when searching and locating the competitive 
actions conducted by a firm during its history. Namely, this search is a lot easier when 
knowing what to look for. 
Going through the listings of competitive actions in 18 different studies (available in 
Nokelainen 2008, pp. 232-240), there are 26 categories to which pretty much all the ac-
tions from different sources can be fit (see Table 2). Of course, the actual wording may 
vary (e.g. product introduction vs. new product offerings) between sources, but this has 
naturally been neglected when ‘fitting’ the actions into categories. Moreover, some ac-
tions have been pooled together with related actions of broader scope (e.g. E-commerce 
initiative included in internet-based actions) in order to make this preliminary list a bit 
more concise. Also, pure industry-specific actions have been excluded except for the 
retail industry –specific actions (Boyd & Bresser 2004), which are closely related to the 
case environment of this study. 
Table 2: Preliminary list of (categories of) competitive actions. 
1 New product 14 Product announcement
2 Mergers and acquisitions 15 Legal (governmental) actions
3 Price changes 16 Signaling actions
4 Promotional actions 17 Outsourcing
5 Joint venture (effort) 18 Organisational restructuring
6 Service actions 19 New distribution (channel)
7 Market expansion (also geographic) 20 Technology / internet-based actions
8 Investment in major resource 21 Retail outlet range / format
9 Major resource divestiture 22 Increase in production (with existing capacity)
10 Product / market exit 23 R&D
11 Product differentiation 24 Management / HR
12 Quality improvements 25 After sales / procurement initiatives
13 Manufacturing (efficiency) 26 Vertical integration  
It is obvious that there are certain deficiencies in the categorisation above, as there are 
in the initial studies as well. Nokelainen (2008) lists some of these weaknesses in his 
dissertation, in which he consequently builds a typology that is supposed to overcome 
these deficiencies. First, the actions in different studies aren’t always theoretically rig-
orously derived. Second, they bring forth industry-specific actions, although this issue 
has already been overcome in terms of this study as these kinds of actions were neglect-
ed from the initial table above (excl. retail-specific moves that were included). Third, 
pretty much all the initial studies (from which the preliminary list was gathered) include 
types of actions that aren’t fully explicated in the articles (e.g. Smith et al (1991) have 
16 types but 10 of them unspecified). Fourth, Nokelainen (2008, p. 82) stresses that ex-
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cept for Offstein & Gnyawali (2005) the number of categories (actions) is suspiciously 
low in all the studies. 
However, it must be noticed that Nokelainen (2008) intends to, among other things, 
“develop a typology which addresses, theoretically, the variety (i.e. the ontology) of dif-
ferent competitive actions” (ibid. p. i), whereas in this study the main object of having 
different competitive actions listed is to know what kind of things to look for in the em-
pirical case context. Moreover, even this is not the ultimate goal of this study, but rather 
it is a means to understand better the decline and turnaround process (through competi-
tive position and dynamics). And as was explained earlier, the competitive actions that 
are observed in this study rely mainly on the definition of Chen & Hambrick (1995, p. 
456), i.e. as specific, detectable and externally directed competitive moves initiated by a 
firm in order to […] defend or improve its competitive position. Therefore, the prelimi-
nary list of competitive actions presented in Table 2 can be modified, as internally di-
rected moves such as R&D aren’t considered as relevant in this context.  
A modified, although still just indicative list of competitive actions to be looked for in 
the case context is presented in Table 3. Even if certain internal and not so detectable 
actions have been omitted since the preliminary list in Table 2, it has to be stressed that 
these moves aren’t considered as irrelevant when analysing a firm performance and thus 
any decline and turnaround case. It is just that they aren’t considered as such competi-
tive actions that have direct effect on competition and competitive dynamics. Rather 
they are ‘forces’ that result in more detectable and externally directed actions – e.g. 
R&D investments (considered as competitive action by Offstein & Gnyawali 2005) can 
be made in order to get more innovative product launches, which in turn have an imme-
diate effect on competitive market. 
Table 3: Modified list of (categories of) competitive actions. 
1 New product 10 Product / market exit
2 Mergers and acquisitions 11 Product differentations
3 Price changes 12 Quality improvement (externally detectable)
4 Promotional actions (incl. product announcement) 13 Legal actions (aimed at competition / competitor)
5 Joint venture (effort) 14 New distribution channel
6 Service-based actions 15 Technology / internet-based action (externally detectable)
7 Market expansion (also geographic) 16 Retail outlet range / format
8 Investment in major resource (externally detectable) 17 Vertical integration
9 Major resource divestiture (externally detectable)  
 
3.3. Decline and turnaround through competitive behav-
iour 
I have now presented the connection between competitive actions, competitive ad-
vantage and firm performance. An indicative repertoire of possible competitive actions 
has been delivered together with the discussion of the basic features of the dynamics 
created by the ‘exchange of these actions’. However, it is yet to be discussed what kind 
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of behaviour in the competitive environment and ‘interface’ may be incorporated with a 
performance decline, and if there is some insight in the existing literature about possible 
competitive activity that might lead to a successful turnaround. 
Basically, from the competitive point of view, the whole idea of strategy is to defend 
and improve competitive position (Porter 1980), i.e. the relative competitive advantage a 
firm possesses vis-à-vis its competitors. This is in line with the earlier presented concep-
tion that strategy (which materialises in competitive actions) enables competitive ad-
vantage, which in turn, as just pointed out, defines competitive position (see Figure 3). 
Therefore, it seems obvious that a declining company fails to not only improve its com-
petitive position, but even defend its existing status in the competition. Of course, it is 
possible that a company meets some criteria and definitions of decline (i.e. an existence-
threatening deterioration in an organisational performance induced by maladaption to 
changes in environment) even if its competitive position remains stable or even im-
proves. However, this kind of situation would mean that the whole industry and / or 
market was well past maturity phase and in serious trouble. So generally speaking, and 
especially in this study where decline is somewhat measured by decreasing market 
share, it is obvious that deteriorating performance means failure in defending competi-
tive position. 
From the perspective of Austrian economics, the commanding nature of competition 
and rivalry is the ‘disequilibrium’ i.e. turbulence created by the continuing exchange of 
competitive actions between market players (Kirtzner 1997). According to the definition 
of Ferrier et al. (1999), competitive action is “any newly developed market-based move 
that challenges the status quo of the market process”, where status quo is seen as rou-
tine, ordinary, and patterned competitive behaviour (Nelson & Winter 1982, O'Driscoll 
& Rizzo 1985). Combining these two views leads to a conclusion that lack of competi-
tive activity can lead to a deteriorating competitive position and thus decline. This is 
because inactivity means in a way accepting the status quo and not challenging it. And 
in situations of rivalry – i.e. non-monopoly – status quo won’t exist long as the moves 
made by competitors lead to disequilibrium (Austrian school). Moreover, a famous Aus-
trian economist Joseph Schumpeter (1934) implies this same by addressing that once a 
leading market position is won by felicitous competitive action, a leading firm inevita-
bly finds itself imitated by competitors. Therefore, “leading firms sometimes decline 
when they rest on their laurels and become complacent, which renders them vulnerable 
to competitive challenges” (Ferrier et al. 1991, p. 374). This kind of thinking that ‘suc-
cess breeds failure’ is common in both themes for research: decline and turnaround (e.g. 
Mellahi et al. 2002) as well as competitive dynamics (e.g. Miller & Chen 1994). 
In addition to just aggressively performing competitive actions in order to improve 
competitive position as such, this activeness can be beneficial in another way as well. 
Young et al. (1996) argue that as a firm's cumulative competitive activity increases, the 
firm creates internal organizational assets in the form of action repertoires, routines, and 
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knowledge about how to carry out action. According to this view, even unsuccessful 
actions are in a way beneficial as a firm learns which kinds of actions are ineffective. 
Moreover, the cost of taking action is lower for the firm that has a rich history of prior 
activity and they are also capable of undertaking more moves in a given time period. 
(Ferrier et al. 1999) 
It sounds reasonable that a company which doesn’t show any activity in competitive 
market (i.e. doesn’t perform competitive actions) will eventually face difficulties as the 
environment and the ‘rules of competition’ change. However, explaining any decline 
with just inactivity in terms of performing competitive actions is definitely a false con-
clusion. And on the other hand, aggressive and active approach without clear strategy 
and reasoning behind performed actions can sure be at least equally harmful as inactivi-
ty. Therefore, it should be analysed further what kind of competitive behaviour may 
lead to decline and on the other hand to a sustainable high performance. 
In addition to the number of performed actions, the speed of these moves is thought to 
influence the performance level of a firm (Ferrier et al. 1999). Proactive and agile firms 
use the rapid timing of new actions to outmanoeuvre competitors, and e.g. firms that 
introduce new products quickly are studied to experience a gain in shareholder wealth 
(Lee et al. 1999). On the other hand, as already discussed in this study, e.g. Teece 
(1987) comments that imitators may well generate bigger profit from a new product due 
to for example their lower development costs. Basically, however, a key principle in 
dynamic competition is to move quickly rather than wait for competitors to find first the 
new competitive moves that will slow the competitive activity of rivals (Smith et al. 
1992).  
Moreover, another feature of competitive behaviour said to affect performance is the 
diversity of performed actions. Generally speaking, firms that carry out a broad set of 
action types can be seen as more capable and also as less predictable (D'Aveni 1994). 
Accordingly, from the perspective of Austrian economics, the breadth of a firm's reper-
toire of competitive actions has a broad influence on performance (Ferrier et al. 1999, p. 
376). Miller & Chen (1994) find that successful past can be a burden also in this con-
text, as success may cause strategic simplicity and therefore result in organizational de-
cline. This is because over time managers may feel comfortable in relying only on a nar-
row range of actions that have worked in the past. (ibid.) 
Closely related to this diversity issue is the matter of strategic consistency. Certain re-
searchers (e.g. Barnett & Hansen 1996) see consistency of performed actions (i.e. real-
ised strategy) as a major condition for firm survival. However, this consistency should 
not be seen as an opposite feature for previously discussed diversity issue. Namely con-
sistency refers to adjusting actions to changes in environment (Zajac et al. 2000) while 
simultaneously considering the action patterns in firm’s history (i.e. ensuring continuity) 
(Nelson & Winter 1982). Thus, the search for diversity in competitive behaviour should 
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not lead to gyrating but finding various and changing ways of executing continuous and 
consistent strategy – in other words, aiming at the same goal but with different kinds of 
shots. 
Abovementioned characteristics of competitive behaviour are pretty much about the ac-
tions of a particular firm independently. However, the nature of behaviour in relation to 
rivals is also influencing the eventual success of performed competitive strategy. Ferrier 
et al. (1999) draw conclusions from previous research and argue that for an industry 
leader it is important to carry out actions that differ from those of the competition. This 
is in line with previously discussed idea, according to which it can be fatal to content 
oneself with the existing status quo as rivals are expected to aim aggressive attacks to-
ward the market leader. Or as D’Aveni (1994) puts it, an industry leader must continu-
ously seek to take new actions that are different from challengers' so as to present a 
moving target. All in all, the market leaders should actively attempt to disrupt the status 
quo themselves and not just to rely on continuing ‘as before’ even if everything was fi-
ne. As for the challengers, Ferrier et al. (1999) propose performing actions similar to 
leader’s but being more aggressive in doing so. Thus, in terms of action dissimilarity, 
the implied ‘instruction’ is different for leading companies than it is for companies try-
ing to challenge the leaders. 
In a nut shell, inactivity, sluggishness, lack of diversity or consistency and failure in po-
sitioning competitive actions vis-à-vis to competitors can lead to performance deteriora-
tion. However, even if all these appear to be valid issues, it would certainly be too nar-
row sighted to explain any real-life performance decline and turnaround without consid-
ering case-specific and non-generalised matters. Then again, accepting the importance 
of the case-specific matters doesn’t mean that it wouldn’t be interesting to also address 
these abovementioned variables when comparing the competitive behaviour of the case 
company and its rivals. 
 
3.4. Summary of competitive layer 
I have now presented the obvious linkage between competitive behaviour of a company 
and its eventual performance level. Of course, it is debatable how well and directly dif-
ferent performance indicators are related to competitive position, but at least studying 
changes in market share should give some insight into the success rate of firm’s compet-
itive strategy. So, as a company seeks for competitive advantages over its rivals, it has 
to perform a set of competitive actions in order to defend and / or improve its position. 
As it has already become rather clear, it is not self-evident which moves are competitive 
actions and which are not, as the definition varies between different scholars. However, 
in this study I consider them to be specific, detectable and externally directed competi-
tive moves initiated by a firm in order to defend or improve its competitive position. 
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And when these individual actions are viewed within a context, i.e. the competitive en-
vironment of rivalry, they constitute a dynamic exchange of initiating and responsive 
moves. Research on competitive dynamics has largely been focusing on the action-
response dyad, i.e. how companies ‘attack’ toward each other and respectively defend 
themselves by launching responsive reactions (Chen & Macmillan 1992). However, 
competitive dynamics scholars have also turned their focus to patterns in competitive 
moves (Boyd & Bresser 2004, pp. 6-7), and thus studying the wider perspective of 
competitive behaviour is justified within the frame of competitive dynamics.  
So even if the focus isn’t firmly on individual actions, I have presented above some 
views of existing literature on the variety of competitive actions. This is done in order to 
facilitate the collection of competitive action catalogues of the case company and its 
main competitor during the research period. Accordingly, I modified my own shortlist 
of possible actions based on different existing studies. The purpose behind this was to 
exclude internal and not-so-well detectable moves from being considered as part of this 
competitive layer. 
 Strategy can be seen as a “pattern in a stream of actions” that a company performs 
(Mintzberg 1978). Thus, studying the actions of a specific company should give insight 
into the strategic decisions and plans that are made by the top management. However, 
Mintzberg also addresses that not all strategic intentions can be realized and that addi-
tional, previously unintended (i.e. emergent) actions may develop gradually. Therefore, 
the realized action patters (i.e. strategies) are different from the initially intended ones 
(ibid.). This alone indicates the need to understand the more internal layer of decision 
making (and organisation in general) in addition to the competitive market level dis-
cussed in this chapter. So, the decline and turnaround case, which can be observed from 
changes in firm performance (e.g. market share), is studied in a context of the competi-
tive market; in a process of decline and turnaround, are there some deficiencies and suc-
cessful patterns respectively in the competitive behaviour of a case company?  
To sum up the role of ‘competitive layer’ in this study, I consider the externally directed 
and detectable actions, in a way, to be an ‘interface’ in which both the performance de-
ficiencies of decline stage and the turnaround strategy of the upturn stage are materialis-
ing. Thus, even if the fundamental causes and triggers for decline and turnaround were 
more internal and intangible, they still reflect in the actions that are performed on mar-
ket. To sum up my approach a bit further, I consider the competitive market as a playing 
field where it is decided if a company is performing well or not (like a football field 
where the goals are scored and thus winners decided). This is in line with the decision 
of employing (changes in) market share as the main indicator of (changing) perfor-
mance. However, the real deficiencies as well as turnaround strategies often lie ‘deeper’ 
in the organisation, and this internal ‘field’ (the locker-room) is the one where the actual 
formulation of turnaround strategy and decision making take place (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Framework describing the connections between performance level (decline and turna-
round), competitive dynamics and internal context of an organisation. 
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4. TURNAROUND STRATEGIES FOR 
SUCCESSFUL RECOVERY 
Thus far I have presented the main terminology and process view of decline and turna-
round phenomenon. Following this I introduced the linkage between firm performance 
and competitive position, which accordingly justifies that studying competitive actions 
can give valuable insight in decline and turnaround cases. However, even if many stud-
ies concentrate on this interaction, i.e. competitive dynamics vs. firm performance (e.g. 
Ferrier et al. 1999, Young et al. 1996, Chen & Hambrick 1995, Miller & Chen 1996), it 
should also be interesting to widen the perspective from competitive market to more 
internal features of an organisation. For example, Ferrier et al. (1999, p. 385) mention 
that “a potentially fruitful […] research would be exploration of the contingency rela-
tionships between organizational characteristics, competitive actions and performance”. 
Most probably Ferrier et al. (1999) imply to exploring firm variables, such as size, age 
or heterogeneity of the top management team, and how these contingencies influence 
the competitive behaviour and thus the performance of a company. In this study I don’t 
focus on this kind of contingency relationship, but the threefold approach (i.e. internal 
environment of a company, competitive environment, performance) employed is some-
what similar with the proposition of Ferrier et al. (1999).  
To further sum up this threefold approach of mine (see also Figure 4), the performance 
level is where the decline and turnaround are shown, or on the other hand, decline and 
turnaround ‘happen’ in relation to performance. And in chapter two I have presented the 
criteria, main stages as well as terminology related to this process of changing perfor-
mance.  
On the next level (‘going down’), there is the competitive market / environment. And it 
is how a company behaves here, i.e. the actions it produces, that decide if it will possess 
competitive advantage(s) or not. And further, the competitive advantage possessed vis-
à-vis to competitors determines the competitive position, which can be seen as a rather 
abstract variable that decides how a company is performing on this competitive market 
level. Accordingly, in chapter three I have presented these interconnections between 
competitive behaviour and performance together with other main features related to 
competition and competitive dynamics.  
In this chapter four I will focus on the third level of this threefold approach. As I am 
considering the competitive actions to be externally observable, market directed moves, 
the more internal environment and actions as well as decisions taken there aren’t seen as 
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directly affecting the competition. Therefore, this internal level is the third part in my 
approach. For example, like discussed in the previous chapter, performing competitive 
actions of too narrow range may lead to a performance decline (Ferrier et al. 1999). 
However, the root causes and the actual reasons for this kind of competitive behaviour 
lie inside the organisation. It may be for example, that the top management team is too 
cautious or that the resource base of a company is too simple to perform a diverse range 
of different actions. Or even if everything ‘on the setting’ was fine and there were all 
the capabilities to perform the right actions, it is still inside the organisation where the 
decisions are made. Therefore, understanding the internal features (resources, character-
istics, strategy etc.) could explain even more why it is the certain competitive behaviour 
which is externally detectable.  
So, in this chapter four, I will first focus on the decline part and how different causes of 
deteriorating performance affect the turnaround attempt. Then I will present the views 
of existing literature on the efforts made and strategies chosen by firms when stemming 
decline and trying to recover from it. These guidelines derived from existing research 
should help when analysing the turnaround of the case company and its competitive be-
haviour. Like has been discussed above, the strategy is in a way materialising in com-
petitive actions, but analysing only these actions won’t alone reveal the actual flow of 
events that has occurred inside a company. Therefore, the turnaround strategy and deci-
sion-making processes behind it include this internal aspect as well – with the external 
competitive environment as an interface between the internal organisation and the even-
tual performance.  
 
4.1. Causes and consequences of decline as contingen-
cies for turnaround attempt 
“The causes of decline will influence which recovery strategies will be effective” 
(Arogyaswamy et al. 1995, p. 496) – thus it is integral to pay attention to the perfor-
mance deterioration phase even if the main issue under research is turnaround. As men-
tioned earlier, certain kind of competitive behaviour can lead to performance decline, as 
e.g. too slow reacting to competitors’ moves may result in decreasing sales (Ferrier et 
al. 1999). However, even if the decline was closely connected to performed false actions 
(or lack of performed actions on the other hand), there would certainly be some other 
forces of decline that lie ‘deeper’ in the organisation.  Moreover, there are forces of de-
cline which are neither reflected from the competition nor are they really about any in-
ternal deficiencies. These kind of external decline forces (but not directly related to 
competition) include e.g. negatively influencing political decisions and general econom-
ic depression (Pajunen 2004). 
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As the abovementioned external decline forces may certainly have a major role in any 
decline, they are somewhat discussed here, even if more focus is given to the issues that 
are more directly related to internal strategy and decision making of a company. In gen-
eral, the external decline forces are emphasized among industrial organisation scholars 
claiming that choosing a right industry is even more fundamental question than actually 
performing and operating well in the chosen industry (e.g. Porter’s five forces, Porter 
1979). In the end it is obviously very case-specific how much the external decline forces 
can be blamed, but as I presented in chapter two, many definitions for decline refer to 
maladaption or inability to respond to changes in environment. Thus, it is eventually up 
to management if it decides to ‘surrender to its fate’ and blame the inhospitable industry 
and circumstances or take the opposite approach and fight against the external decline 
forces. It should also be noted already at this stage, that the case environment in this 
study is Finnish consumer goods retail trade, which is a defensive industry in a rather 
stable (e.g. political) environment, so the impact of external decline forces has not been 
overly dramatic throughout the years, while neither should it be fully neglected (note 
e.g. the economic recession in the early 1990s). 
Some of the negative features in macro-environment can of course be such drastic, that 
not so much can be done by the firm to overcome those at least in the short term (see 
Table 4) (Barker & Barr 2002). This is in line with the findings of Arogyaswamy et al. 
(1995), who claim that in cyclical contraction driven decline the most effective recovery 
activities are the ones which do not attempt to transform the existing strategy fundamen-
tally but focus on strengthening the historic position of a firm. This kind of rather in-
cremental development / reorientation may well mean e.g. closing down the scope of 
operations and concentrating on the most viable customer segment(s) or geographies, 
without changing that much the actual business model (ibid. p. 510).  
Table 4: Examples of external and internal forces of decline (Pajunen 2004, p. 80). 
External forces of decline Internal forces of decline
(conceptual examples:) (conceptual examples:)
Business cycles Managerial disagreements
Depression Organisational disagreements
Political crises Lack of knowledge and / or resources
Deteriorating industry Lack of capabilities
Government's negative policy decisions Dysfunctional organisation
Inadequate control  
Studying decline and turnaround through changes in macro environment isn’t probably 
as interesting as focusing on internal deficiencies, as for example economic depression 
hits several companies and industries in similar way without leaving much notice to 
firm specific factors. However, one interesting issue related to external forces is that 
also supportive external environment can actually be a source of decline. Hambrick & 
D’Aveni (1988) noticed that managers of firms that are weak might end up sinking their 
companies into complete failure if industry indications seem extremely supportive a few 
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years prior to bankruptcy. If these indications don’t eventually come true in full power 
the early signs of encouragement could have either a lulling effect (resulting in lack of 
actions) or an emboldening effect (resulting in more action than the firm can actually 
manage) (ibid. p. 17). This proposition is nicely in line with the earlier presented view 
according to which both inactivity and gyrating aggressiveness in terms of performing 
competitive actions may lead to performance decline. 
As has been explained above, the main interest in this ‘layer’ is in internal organisation 
and its features causing performance deterioration and consequential turnaround. Look-
ing at the list in Table 4 together with common reasoning implies that managerial issues 
are certainly in focal point when considering both decline and turnaround. At least de-
cline forces related to managerial disagreements, lack of knowledge and capabilities as 
well as inadequate control are all somewhat linked to problems in corporate manage-
ment. The role of management in decline and turnaround is well studied area, with man-
agement heterogeneity (Hambrick et al. 1996), causal attributions of management 
(Barker & Barr 2002), managerial experience (Miller 1991) and management replace-
ment (Khanna & Poulsen 1995, Bibeault 1998) as examples of the viewpoints of these 
studies.  
However, many of the studies trying to clear up the managerial issues in decline and 
turnaround end up with somewhat mixed results. For example, Hambrick et al. (1996) 
mention that failed competitive actions do cause decline, but it is not so self-evident 
how management heterogeneity i.e. diverse backgrounds in top management team (e.g. 
in terms of educational background) reflect to these bad decisions. There is debate also 
on the role of top management change in turnaround situation. Many papers assume that 
management change is in the central role (Arogyaswamy et al. 1995, p. 496), but then 
again e.g. Khanna & Poulsen (1995) end up stressing that managers are largely serving 
as scapegoats when they are blamed for financial distress. However, these two opinions 
aren’t necessarily in contradiction, as a breath of fresh air in top management may well 
result in positive change even if the previous management wasn’t to blame. Respective-
ly in some situations it may be justified and important to keep the experienced manage-
ment in house and not to make changes even if the decline was caused by serious mana-
gerial mistakes. Therefore, the main point is that causes of decline must be considered 
as important contingencies before executing any management changes / reorganisations 
or other stabilisation and recovery activities (Arogyaswamy et al. 1995). 
In addition to the root causes of decline, also the consequences arising from perfor-
mance deterioration affect the need and means to perform stabilisation and recovery. 
Arogyaswamy et al. (1995, p. 504) mention severity of decline and level of organisa-
tional slack as the two most important contingencies determining which kind of decline-
stemming is needed. These two go normally hand in hand, as the level of slack (i.e. sur-
plus resources in store for ‘bad times’) pretty much defines how serious the situation 
actually is (ibid., p. 505). Naturally the more serious the decline the more drastic actions 
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are required. For example, it the financial slack is almost fully spent (including reserve 
funding, see e.g. Prihti 1975), then divesting assets (i.e. asset retrenchment) can be the 
only way to generate necessary cash flow for covering various expenses (Pearce & 
Robbins 1992, p. 304). 
Even if certain researchers have tried to find universally valid guidelines for recovering 
from performance decline, it is obvious that case-specific contingencies are in focal 
point when planning any recovery strategies. Should top management be changed in 
turnaround (e.g. Mueller & Barker 1997)? Is aggressive retrenchment an answer to de-
cline or would it be wiser to keep as much of the resources in house as possible (e.g. 
Pearce & Robbins 1992 vs. Barker & Mone 1994)? How about efficiency improvement, 
should it be sought with existing business model or is more concrete strategy transfor-
mation a better way to recovery? These are all questions that a firm must address when 
planning decline-stemming and recovery strategies. At that point is imperative to ana-
lyse the causes as well as consequences of decline so that right cures are found for the 
performance deterioration. (Arogyaswamy et al. 1995)  
Some main guidelines for preferred action under certain contingencies are presented in 
Figure 5 based on existing literature. They should not be considered as compelling in-
structions but rather demonstrative views of different alternatives in different situations. 
Contingency Guideline(s)
external contraction incremental efficiency improvement
Cause of decline
internal issues strategic reorientation / transformation
keep management
change management
lostStakeholder / employee
support maintained
change management
keep management
high with little slackDecline
severity low with some extra slack
major retrenchment (asset divestments)
mild if any retrenchment (mainly cost cutting)  
Figure 5: Broad guidelines for decline-stemming and recovery under different circum-stances 
(based on Arogyaswamy et al. 1995, Pearce & Robbins 1992, Barker & Barr 2002). 
 
4.2. Stemming decline with stabilisation and retrench-
ment activities 
Roles of decline forces, causes and consequences when facing turnaround situation were 
discussed in the previous sub-chapter. Some indicative guidelines for certain circum-
stances were also presented mainly in order to declare that causal contingencies do mat-
ter when planning recovery activities. Following sub-chapters will accordingly focus on 
the actual turnaround strategy and its possible ‘ingredients’ based on what has been dis-
cussed in existing literature. As a reminder I’d like to stress again that even if competi-
tive actions represent strategy (i.e. strategy becomes manifest as patterns in the streams 
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of these actions) (Boyd & Bresser 2004, p. 4), the roots for this strategy lie deeper in-
side the organisation structure, resources, decision making, culture etc. 
As was discussed in chapter two, turnaround is rather popularly accepted to consist of 
two parts: stabilisation and recovery (or be it retrenchment and return to growth). The 
role of first phase is to ‘stop the bleeding’ and halt declining performance so that the 
existence of an organisation could be ensured until it’s too late (Pajunen 2004, pp. 82-
83). Arogyaswamy et al. (1995) propose that this stabilisation stage should address three 
critical issues in order to support the gradual recovery as comprehensively as possible: 
ensuring stakeholder support, eliminating inefficiency and stabilising the firm’s internal 
climate (and decision processes). These three matters will be discussed shortly in the 
following sub-chapters. 
 
4.2.1. Ensuring stakeholder support 
“A stakeholder in an organisation is any group or individual who can affect or is affect-
ed by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman 1984, p. 46). It is ob-
vious that a company has failed to achieve at least some of its objectives once in de-
cline, so stakeholders’ interest and worry is certainly high under any turnaround situa-
tion. In a severe decline the possibility of bankruptcy is always relevant and thus stake-
holders are eager to defend and support their interest in a company. Financiers are natu-
rally worried about their money, employees are scared of losing their jobs, clients and 
suppliers might lose an important partner and possibly advance payments and public 
stakeholders like governments and municipalities would also face negative consequenc-
es in a case of a bankruptcy (Cornell & Shapiro 1984). 
Therefore, it is common that firm’s relationships with stakeholders (especially external 
ones) deteriorate as a consequence of decline, as it might become impossible for the de-
clining firm to fulfil all the agreed duties and obligations toward every stakeholder 
group (Sutton 1990). This relationship deterioration can be fatal for an already suffering 
company, as it may well lead to even increasing financing costs, tightening contract 
terms with partners and weakening image among stakeholders in general. As a result of 
more difficult stakeholder relationships and weakening negotiation power a company 
faces even further performance reductions, which can accordingly cause more erosion 
of stakeholder support (Arogyaswamy et al. 1995, pp. 499-500). This kind of spiral of 
cumulating negative issues is a common feature of a decline process as is declared by 
e.g. Hambrick & D’Aveni (1988). 
Many studies have stressed the importance of stakeholder management activities in or-
der to increase or at least maintain the vital stakeholder support during stabilisation 
phase. The ultimate objective of these activities is to ensure the stakeholders that with 
their continuing support the declining firm can overcome the difficulties and thus re-
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establish the relationship where both parties benefit from one another. It is obvious that 
bankruptcy would hardly support any of the stakeholders’ favours, and thus aiming for 
successful turnaround should in practice get the support from various stakeholders. 
(Arogyaswamy et al. 1995) Of course in real life there might be hidden agendas and dif-
fering motives among stakeholder groups, as e.g. some representatives may see decline 
situation as a great opportunity to gain more power in organisational decision making. 
Therefore, it is important for the management to positively influence the perceptions of 
external stakeholders and to set objectives which support the interests of different 
groups as fairly as possible (Gopinath 1991). As an example of a concrete stakeholder 
management action Arogyaswamy et al. (1995, p. 502) mention Chrysler’s decision to 
give the labour union (United Automobile Workers) a representation in the company 
board of directors. This helped Chrysler to implement difficult austerity measures with-
out losing the support of employees and labour union (ibid.). This example shows that 
sacrifices can and often have to be done by both (or multiple) parties so that a successful 
turnaround can be achieved. 
As mentioned earlier, the stabilisation phase is widely considered to aim at reversing the 
consequences of decline and therefore addressing negative financial issues is often in 
focal point. Ensuring the continuity of an organisation means not letting it to go bank-
rupt, which is eventually decided by the ability of an organisation to deal with its finan-
cial obligations toward various creditors (e.g. Prihti 1975). Naturally the ability increas-
es the more financial slack is available once in decline, and this is largely the reason 
why level of slack is probably the main variable when determining the severity of de-
cline (see sub-chapter 4.1). Due to its central stage in decline phenomenon, the financial 
matter has been studied exhaustively in relation to performance deterioration. Most of 
these studies have concentrated on predicting corporate failure (decline) based on finan-
cial ratios (e.g. Altman 1968, Prihti 1975, Taffler 1983, Smith & Graves 2005).   
However, in this study the role of financing issues is largely related to the means and 
obligations that a company has when attempting turnaround. And this is where this fi-
nancing matter comes close to stakeholder relationships. As a result of decline a firm 
often faces liquidity crisis i.e. it doesn’t have financial resources to cope with various 
financial engagements. These obligations consist of e.g. interest payments and debt 
amortisation (lenders), raw material and service fees (suppliers), salaries (employees) 
and dividends (shareholders). Some of the obligations (at least dividends) can be omit-
ted temporarily in order to survive from a cash crisis, but other engagements might be 
such tight that without co-operation with the specific creditor a liquidation (or bankrupt-
cy) can happen really fast. (Prihti 1975) And what makes the spiral of decline even 
more challenging is that if a firm is able to gain stakeholder support, it is bound to come 
with an increased price. As the risk for bankruptcy increases the creditors require higher 
premium form their support; higher interest rates for loans, higher advance payments for 
suppliers and less flexibility for other obligations in general (Arogyaswamy et al. 1995, 
p. 499).  
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The decisive role of financing and liquidity means that a declining firm must establish 
viable relationship and interaction with its creditor stakeholders. No matter how good 
the initial recovery strategy plans are, a company simply goes bankrupt if it can’t handle 
its financial obligations (or agree about payment schedules). And as there are often nu-
merous creditors for whom the company owns money, it is not necessarily easy to find a 
solution that satisfies everyone. Therefore, having an open relationship with stakehold-
ers and credible management with credible plans (Smith & Graves 2005, p. 306) is im-
perative in order to make through the stabilisation phase – this especially if a company 
doesn’t possess reasonable financial slack. (Arogyaswamy et al. 1995) 
 
4.2.2. Eliminating inefficiency 
Inefficiency is often seen as a major cause behind firm decline (Bibeault 1998, Slatter & 
Lovett 1999) and this is certainly true in some occasions. However, Arogyaswamy et al. 
(1995, p. 500) propose that inefficiency may well be a consequence of performance de-
terioration more often than a root-cause of it. This is a relevant view in relation to com-
petitive advantage, as loss of customers to competitors (i.e. decreasing competitive posi-
tion) leads to deteriorating demand. As a result of decreasing sales, the existing cost and 
asset base become under-utilized which naturally causes the observed inefficiency 
(ibid.). Persistent inefficiency leads to drastic financial problems, as a firm can’t take 
part in price competition and might even find itself generating negative cash flow (Slat-
ter & Lovett 1999). Therefore, addressing inefficiency – be it a cause or a consequence 
of decline – is a necessary step on a way to possible recovery. 
It has been mentioned in several occasions already that retrenchment is often a major 
part of decline stemming process. Retrenchment refers to restructuring, downsizing and 
downscoping, i.e. activities concentrating on cost and asset reductions as means to miti-
gate the causes and / or consequences of firm decline (Pearce & Robbins 1992). The 
main object is obviously getting rid of assets and costs that are under-utilized, but 
Arogyaswamy et al. (1995, p. 502) remind also about the importance of improving cash 
flow as a result of retrenchment. These extra proceeds may serve as a vital benefit when 
trying to avoid the risk of insolvency.  
Whether or not retrenchment is a necessity for succeeding in turnaround is not well 
agreed. For example, Hambrick & Schecter (1983), Pearce & Robbins (1992, 1994) and 
Chowdhury & Lang (1996) all imply that rather drastic efficiency-oriented moves are 
essential for almost any turnaround initiative. Then again e.g. Barker & Mone (1994) 
and Arogyaswamy & Yasai-Ardekani (1997) are sharing an opposite view. The former 
claim that “reducing assets or costs in an absolute sense does not always mean that effi-
ciencies are gained or that a stabilised core of operations is achieved” (Barker & Mone 
1994. p. 397). They continue by criticising the overemphasis of retrenchment also by 
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mentioning that declining firms are often forced to sell their best assets while retrench-
ing, as there is hardly a viable market for underperforming units or assets.  
While the inevitability of retrenchment remains debated, it is again certain that different 
contingencies have to be taken into account when planning possible restructuring activi-
ties. It has been mentioned that stabilisation is mainly about addressing the consequenc-
es of decline. Some specific decline contingencies and their influence in stabilisation 
and recovery activities were discussed in chapter 4.1. So, it is clear, that decline (i.e. 
historical events) affects turnaround. However, the actions performed in decline-
stemming phase should also be streamlined with the wider context of long-term recov-
ery strategy. According to Arogyaswamy et al. (1995, p. 495), “the competitive strate-
gies chosen by firm’s top management (i.e. recovery strategies) […] will likely impact 
the tactics used to increase efficiency” (i.e. retrenchment). This means that feedback 
loops between stages (decline, stabilisation, recovery) have to be considered when plan-
ning turnaround activities and strategies (ibid.). So, in a nut shell, possible efficiency 
improvement through retrenchment must not work against long term recovery, but ra-
ther support it by aiming at a common vision. 
Competitive environment is naturally affecting how different activities work while elim-
inating inefficiency. Morrow et al. (2004) studied how retrenchment (asset vs. cost) 
worked in growth, maturity and decline phase of industry. According to their study (pp. 
202-203), both ways of retrenchment should be exploited in mature industries, while 
any kind of retrenchment is hardly effective in declining industries. Furthermore, asset 
retrenchment was seen as a viable effort in growth industry, whereas extensive cost-
cutting doesn’t work that well in these circumstances. These findings are mainly based 
on the feature that the divested assets are valued higher in growth and mature industries 
than in declining ones. Therefore, the retrenching firm gets more cash flow as a result of 
its asset divestitures. The problem here is that the wider context of recovery is some-
what neglected – “while selling off assets, even at a premium price, may generate cash 
in the short run, such actions could stifle the firm’s ability to position itself for success-
fully competing in the long run” (ibid. p. 204). 
Core reason for inefficiency may well lie in declining demand for company’s products, 
as was mentioned above. Thus, improving efficiency is also possible by improving sales 
and not just by cutting costs (or assets). So, all in all, as mentioned by Hofer (1980), in-
creased efficiency coincides often with both retrenchment and increased sales. Seeking 
efficiency improvement through increasing sales is somewhat supported by the findings 
of Arogyaswamy & Yasai-Ardekani (1997), according to which most successful turna-
rounds seem to have experienced both increased efficiency and investment in technolo-
gy without necessarily retrenching. This may well mean increasing the volume of opera-
tions rather than executing cutbacks and asset divestitures. 
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4.2.3. Improving internal climate and decision processes 
Decreasing morale of employees, loss of leader credibility, resistance to change, poli-
ticking and high level of conflict are all features of a declining organisation. Again, it is 
debatable if these are mainly causes or consequences of deteriorating performance, but 
in order to stabilise the operations, performance and working environment it is certain 
that the problems in internal climate have to be fixed. (Arogyaswamy et al. 1995, p. 
501) In a way this rather abstract and tacit concept of internal climate acts behind all the 
other levels, as it is almost impossible to gain stakeholder support or improve efficiency 
if there are drastic problems in organisational ambiance and decision making. And even 
if these stabilisation objectives were met, succeeding in more radical transformation 
while under heavy resistance for change would certainly turn out to be extremely hard. 
Probably the trickiest feature related to employee morale and decline is that efficiency 
improvement often requires retrenchment, which often means downsizing. Thus, an ac-
tion that is meant to support a turnaround turns out to be a serious mistake, as dismissals 
and layoffs can easily lead to even further reduced morale and commitment as well as 
increased alienation and turnover of the important employees (Greenhalgh 1983). 
Guidelines for successful downsizing have been presented in several studies (e.g. To-
masko 1992, Cameron 1994, Ranki 2000), and aspects like employee involvement, 
teamwork, communication and information sharing, rewarding, appraising and training 
are all viewed to be important when extending retrenchment to human resources. 
Closely related to deteriorating internal climate is the matter of problematic decision-
making culture, which implies malfunctioning relationships and processes at the higher 
levels of hierarchy. Decline has earlier been defined as maladaption to external changes, 
and malfunctioning decision making surely restricts top management’s ability to enact 
adaptive organisational changes (Staw et al. 1981). Reason behind problematic decision 
making may lie in e.g. organisational confusion, unclear structures or lack of defined 
accountabilities and responsibilities (Slatter & Lovett 1999, p. 41). Therefore, the hier-
archical scope in this issue should be extended from management to board of directors 
and other groups using decision making power (e.g. administrative board).  
Improving decision processes entails naturally considering the position of top manage-
ment and especially CEO. This question was already discussed in chapter 4.1. from the 
view point of decline contingencies. However, as a concrete stabilisation action the 
change of top management offers certain potential that might be difficult to attain any 
other way. Declining management may lose credibility with external stakeholders and 
become stigmatised (Sutton 1990), and in this kind of situation the management change 
can enhance both stakeholder relationships and decision making. Replacing CEO may 
also serve as an efficient way of improving internal climate and clearing up structures of 
authority. Arogyaswamy et al. (1995, p. 506) propose that outsider leaders, perceived as 
unconnected to previous problems may earn greater ability to stabilise the firm’s inter-
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nal climate. Slatter & Lovett (1999, p. 80) support this view by stating that hiring a 
good ‘company doctor’ with previous turnaround experience rather that specific indus-
try knowledge is beneficial in most cases. For this kind of ‘turnaround guru’ it is essen-
tial to take action quickly and achieve some earl wins, but by succeeding in this the new 
CEO may well turn out to be the single most important asset in turnaround (ibid.). 
 
4.3. Recovery and return to growth 
Stabilisation phase and different activities performed during it are often somewhat 
forced actions as a struggling company tries to survive from day-to-day obligations and 
‘stop the bleeding’ in declining organisation. However, if succeeding in decline-
stemming, gradually a firm begins to look beyond just today and tomorrow, and realises 
that it can and will survive through implementing the necessary changes in fundamental 
issues that caused decline. (Bibeault 1998, pp. 99-102) What has to be remembered 
again though is that even the most acute stabilisation (and retrenchment) actions 
launched under high pressure shouldn’t work against the long-term recovery, i.e. plans 
for recovery strategy have to be considered already while fighting for survival within 
day-to-day obligations (Arogyaswamy et al. 1995).   
So, once some kind of stability has been established in terms of the three aspects (stake-
holders, efficiency, internal climate and decision making), it is time to start implement-
ing those wider-ranging recovery efforts. Some decline-specific contingencies affecting 
recovery were presented in chapter 4.1, but all in all this second part of turnaround is 
commonly agreed to focus on addressing the basic causes behind existence-threatening 
performance deterioration (e.g. Arogyaswamy et al. 1995, Pajunen 2004, Pearce & 
Robbins 1992, 2008). 
 
4.3.1. Different recovery strategies (in different environments) 
Hofer (1980, p. 20) makes a distinction between operative and strategic turnarounds, 
claiming that “operative responses seldom cure strategic problems”. This is again in line 
with the view, that turnaround measures should take into account the nature of problems 
behind declining performance (see e.g. chapter 4.1.). Hofer (1980, p. 30) continues by 
concluding that management seldom adopt strategic turnaround strategies at all, as these 
normally take “longer to pay off”, and even more importantly, as strategic turnarounds 
are possible only at certain time periods. By this Hofer means that effective strategic 
moves can be made only if for example “a competitor slips”. And as Hofer (ibid., p. 28) 
mentions that most strategic turnarounds are preceded by decline in market share (and / 
or sales), it can be concluded that according to his view competitive dynamics (i.e. “a 
competitor slipping while making strategic moves”) play a major role in market share 
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turnaround. Although Hofer (ibid., p. 29) claims also that not enough attention is given 
to strategic turnarounds that involve segmentation and niche hunting instead of increas-
es in market share. 
Niche strategies are also promoted by Arogyaswamy et al. (1995, p. 510), when they 
write that “the most effective recovery strategy for firms with weak positions in declin-
ing industries will entail selectively shrinking firm operations to target one or several 
favourable customer segments”. This kind of niche hunting may well be optimal strate-
gy if the industry is indeed declining, but without such an external decline force the op-
posite strategy regarding market share development should also be considered. In this 
kind of environment Arogyaswamy et al. (1995) continue largely agreeing with Hofer’s 
(1980) view, as they note that ‘strategic reorientation’ (comparable to Hofer’s ‘strategic 
turnaround’) is required in more firm-based decline instead of ‘incremental strategic 
changes’ (comparable to Hofer’s ‘operative turnaround’). And by ‘strategic reorienta-
tion’, Arogyaswamy et al. (1995, p. 509) mean “creating new resources and capabili-
ties”, instead of just trying to develop the way of doing business with existing ones. 
Barker & Duhaime (1997) and later Barker & Barr (2001) find strong support to the 
conclusion that when considering decline to be more driven by internal sources as op-
posed to external sources, managers are likely to successfully engage in more drastic 
strategic reorientation. However, Barker & Barr (2001) also point out, somewhat sur-
prisingly, that the extent of strategic reorientation enacted during a turnaround attempt 
is positively associated e.g. with firm size, as the managers of large organizations may 
tend to focus more internally when performance problems arise, rather than fixating on 
an external crisis (ibid., p. 977).  
A natural conceptual continuum to the abovementioned strategic reorientation, aiming 
at tackling the causes of decline, is the view discussed by Pearce & Robbins (2008), 
who claim that the last step of turnaround should also aim at reducing the chances of 
recurrence of such performance deterioration. There are no new dramatic findings in 
Pearce & Robbins’ (2008) study compared to earlier literature, but they do add some 
value by compiling existing research findings and ending up in a three-fold ‘toolbox’ 
for alternatives after initial retrenchment (i.e. stabilisation).  
The first one, and most dangerous according to Pearce & Robbins (2008, p. 123), is to 
rebuild the company on its prior strategic footprint. This scenario would of course re-
quire as a pre-requisite that no major strategic moves were made in stabilisation phase. 
The company may change its top-management, improve stakeholder relationships and 
internal climate or even add some financial headroom (e.g. through raising capital), but 
e.g. no major asset divestments are possible should the longer-term plan be continuing 
with the same strategic footprint. This kind of “retrenchment may be the turnaround 
strategy” (ibid.) has certain similarities with Hofer’s (1980) operative turnaround con-
cept. 
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The obvious drawback of this alternative is that most likely the competitive landscape 
has changed making the ‘old’ strategy not suitable (as it led to a decline), and even if 
stabilisation phase results in performance turn, the company is still exposed to similar 
assaults in the future (ibid.). Again, “operative responses seldom cure strategic prob-
lems”. 
The second broad alternative by Pearce & Robbins (2008, p. 123) is for the company to 
accept its new reduced form. This is again in line with the ‘niche hunting’ strategy men-
tioned by e.g. Hofer (1980) and Arogyaswamy et al. (1995). The means to achieve this 
kind of status are not that different from potential operative turnaround responses in al-
ternative one, but e.g. more drastic asset / cost retrenchment is possible (or even re-
quired) should the longer-term strategy be becoming more focused, ‘leaner and mean-
er’, player in selected segments (ibid.). 
The third alternative proposed by Pearce & Robbins (2008, p. 124) is “dramatically dif-
ferent” from first two alternatives, called strategic transformation. This means taking 
into account “the environmental forces and competitive dynamics as much as [compa-
ny’s] own resources and capabilities” and to determine “creative ways to attract new 
assets to the company, and reconfigure them in ways that present major new challenges 
to their competition”. Basically, this is fully in line with Arogyaswamy et al.’s (1995, p. 
509) definition of ‘strategic reorientation’, i.e. “creating new resources and capabili-
ties”, instead of just trying to develop the way of doing business with existing ones. 
Pearce & Robbins (2008) focus further on this strategic transformation alternative by 
analyzing ways of ‘achieving’ the desired new strategic state. They propose that broadly 
the ways include acquisitive and collaborative growth. In order to include organic 
growth / diversification to this toolbox, one could somewhat disregard the words “ac-
quisitive” and “collaborative”, and instead just analyze the target areas of growth / di-
versification. By doing this, the work done by Pearce & Robbins (2008) results in a fol-
lowing list of ‘means’ for strategic transformation (listed in the order of “magnitude of 
strategic change” (ibid., p. 125)): 
 Conglomerate diversification 
o ‘Creating’ new business, ‘unrelated’ to existing business portfolio; seek-
ing e.g. balance between cyclical vs. non-cyclical business, or high-risk 
vs. low-risk business; no product-market synergies, but often financial 
synergies. 
 
 Related diversification 
o New business related to (but not identical with) existing business(es) in 
terms of e.g. technology, markets and / or products; results in synergies 
and potentially less risk. 
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 Vertical integration 
o To give e.g. better control of raw materials (backward integration) or in-
crease demand stability (forward integration). 
 
 Joint ventures 
o Becoming contractual partners with another business to provide a miss-
ing capability and / or resource; equity investment by both parties; ena-
bles e.g. fast entry to a new (potentially ‘restricted’) market. 
 
 Innovation 
o Innovations as a ‘grand strategy’; underlying rationale of continuously 
creating new product life-cycle(s) and thereby making similar existing 
products obsolete; “highest degree of unpredictability” of these listed 
strategic ‘means’ (ibid., p. 128). 
 
 Horizontal (acquisition / integration) 
o Growth through (acquiring) business(es) operating at the same stage of 
production-marketing chain; aims at eliminating competition and in-
creasing market share; offers economies of scale and improved efficien-
cy. 
 
 Strategic alliance 
o Contractual partnership like in Joint Venture but without equity compo-
nent; often a defined time period with specified resources (cooperative 
project); learning from one-another; comparable to licensing agreements. 
 
Drawing linkage from the abovementioned, rather unanimous findings (widely support-
ed by other literature as well) to the case example of this study, it could be argued that a 
large declining firm (S-Group) in a defensive industry without drastic external decline-
forces and suffering from market-share erosion (implying changed competitive land-
scape) should involve rather drastic strategic reorientation (or transformation) to its 
turnaround strategy. And that these strategic actions should be timed into ‘right time 
periods’ vis-à-vis to its competitors’ actions (or preferably inactivity). 
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5. CASE DESCRIPTION – S-GROUP POSITION 
IN FINNISH RETAIL TRADE  
5.1. S-Group in brief 
S-Group’s current business and set-up is described shortly in the following. Even if the 
group has evolved throughout the years, its current state gives a good overall view of S-
Group’s core idea throughout its existence. S-Group today is a market leading player in 
the Finnish consumer goods retailing with around 45% market share and strong finan-
cial state (S-Group 2012), so describing its current state gives also perspective against 
which the decline-turnaround process can be analysed (at least implying that ultimately 
a very successful turnaround was indeed accomplished). S-Group’s evolution through 
its history is described more in chapter 5.1.1 and also concerning the competitive ac-
tions during turnaround years, under chapter Error! Reference source not found.. 
S-Group is a Finnish network of companies in the retail and service trade with the core 
of its existence based on cooperative ownership. Throughout the history S-Group has 
been active in a wide variety of businesses (see chapter 5.1.1), and in 2013 S-Group’s 
business portfolio consist of grocery trade, consumer goods trade, service station stores 
and fuel trade, travel industry and hospitality business, automotive trade and agriculture 
trade. (S-Kanava 2013a) For the sake of clarity, in this study I refer to all the above S-
Group’s businesses, dominated by grocery trade, as ‘consumer goods retailing’, which 
is characterising the nature of all S-Group’s businesses as well as the industry under 
analysis in terms of competitive environment. In 2007 S-Group entered also retail bank-
ing business (S-Group 2007, p. 2), but this is largely irrelevant in terms of the research 
focus of this study, as the time scale of S-Group’s decline-turnaround spans only until 
year 2000 (see chapter 5.3).  
In 2012 S-Group’s retail sales reached EUR 12 billion, with the split by business area 
presented below in Figure 6. In this split by business area the Supermarket trade and 
Department stores and specialty stores include both grocery trade and consumer goods 
trade, whereas other business areas match the abovementioned split of S-Group’s busi-
ness portfolio. At the end of 2012 S-Group employed in total over 43,000 employees 
(S-Group 2012, p. 48). 
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Figure 6: S-Group retail sales by business area in 2012 (S-Group 2012, p. 48). *) Including retail 
sales in neighboring countries (namely Russia and the Baltic countries) 
Due to being based on a cooperative ownership model (see chapter 5.1.2), the structure 
of S-Group is somewhat differing from a ‘common’ structure in e.g. large Groups based 
on limited liability company structure, where normally a parent company is owned by 
the ultimate shareholders with a potential chain of subsidiaries then owned by the parent 
company. Figure 7 shows a high-level structure of S-Group, which (in 2013) consists of 
20 independent regional cooperatives, 8 local cooperatives and SOK Corporation, a co-
operative itself, which is owned by the regional and local cooperatives. The cooperative 
network covers whole Finland, while the operations have a strong regional emphasis 
(through regional and local cooperatives). The regional and local cooperatives (which 
own SOK) are owned by the ‘co-op members’, i.e. in the spirit of cooperative model, 
the customers. (S-Kanava 2013a) At the end of 2012 S-Group had 2,055,227 co-op 
members (S-Group 2012, p. 48), i.e. 38% of the whole population of Finland (Statistics 
Finland 2013). 
 
Figure 7: High-level structure of S-Group (S-Kanava 2013a). 
Owned by the cooperatives, SOK (Suomen Osuuskauppojen Keskuskunta) operates as 
the central firm for the (regional and local) cooperatives and produces e.g. procurement, 
expert and support services for them. SOK is also in charge of S-Group's strategic steer-
ing and development. SOK's own business operations supplement S-Group's supply in 
Finland and the neighboring areas, as SOK owns directly subsidiaries active in e.g. su-
permarket trade in Russia and the Baltic countries, hotel business in Finland, Russia and 
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the Baltic countries, automotive trade, agricultural trade and procurement and logistics 
operations. (S-Kanava 2013a, S-Group 2012, p. 78) SOK Corporation’s sales was EUR 
11.7 billion in 2012, although it is important to understand here that while part of this is 
included in the abovementioned EUR 12 billion sales of S-Group, the majority (e.g. 
procurement services provided to regional cooperatives) is eliminated in total S-Group 
sales, as it is internal invoicing within S-Group. (S-Group 2012, p. 61) 
A more detailed organization map, illustrating the ‘ownership structure’ and differing 
‘responsibilities’ of various entities, is shown below in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Detailed organization map of S-Group (S-Kanava 2013b). 
 
5.1.1. Short history of S-Group 
Roots of the cooperative business model in retailing date back to 1840 in Rochdale, 
England. In Finland it took a while before urbanisation reached the levels of other Eu-
rope, and thus cooperative business model wasn’t launched in Finland until late 19th 
century. The idea spread then quickly in the beginning of 20th century, and for example 
the first still existing cooperative was established in 1901 in Turku. At the same the time 
first law concerning cooperative business model was formulated, followed by coopera-
tive businesses rising to almost every community in Finland. This locality / regionality 
is still a dominating feature in Finnish (including S-Group’s) cooperative model. (S-
Kanava 2013c) 
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On 22 March 1904 12 cooperatives signed the establishment document of SOK. At first 
SOK acted only as an adviser and steering company to cooperatives, but its operations 
expanded quickly and four years later it was already the largest centralised wholesaler 
partner in Finnish cooperative environment. (Lahti 2001, p. 8)  
In 1920 there were already over 500 cooperatives in Finland, with 1,400 stores and over 
170,000 co-op members. By this time SOK had already started industrial production 
(e.g. knittery, brush factory and spice and tea packing plant), and the cooperative activi-
ties were divided into those politically bourgeoisie and those of the working class. (S-
Kanava 2013c) 
Between 1920 and 1950 S-Group became a central force in the Finnish economy: SOK 
strengthened its status as the leading wholesale dealer while also expanding its industri-
al operations to cover e.g. energy production, paper mill and even sweets and margarine 
factories. During this time S-Group became also an important player in the Finnish so-
ciety in general, as it pioneered with its customer loyalty concept and supported the 
Finnish Defense Forces during the Winter War and World War II by e.g. handing over 
factories for the government. (S-Kanava 2013c) 
After the World War II the role of S-Group and other cooperatives became even more 
important in terms of the reconstruction of post-war Finland. Cooperative shops, coop-
erative banks and producers' cooperatives were in a central role in revitalizing and reset-
tlement of Finnish countryside. The core ideas of cooperative membership, i.e. locality 
and responsibility, were strongly emphasized in these difficult times, in a way working 
against S-Group during the following decades, as will be discussed further in this sec-
tion. (S-Kanava 2013c) 
One of the most significant structural changes in consumer goods retailing dates back to 
1950s, when self-service shops were introduced to give more ‘freedom’ for customers 
to choose their products. This development led slowly but surely towards larger stores 
and so-called general stores, with smaller, specialized and ‘service-heavy’ boutique-
type shops facing pressure. (Lahti 2001, pp. 8-9) S-Group answered this change by in-
troducing its Sokos concept (the first Sokos department store was opened on Manner-
heimintie in Helsinki in the Olympic year 1952), with name Sokos extended to even 
smaller shops, hotels and units in other business areas, such as machinery and hardware 
shops. However, at the same time S-Group still focused largely on smaller-scale busi-
ness in rural areas, with e.g. ‘mobile shops’ being introduced during 1950s. (S-Kanava 
2013c) 
The abovementioned structural change in consumer goods retailing coincided with the 
booming urbanization in Finland, which in 1960s was faster than in most other Europe-
an countries. While in the beginning of 1960s the Finnish population living in rural are-
as exceeded two million, 15 years later this had dropped to approximately 1.6 million (-
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20%). At the same time population living in central urban areas (Helsinki, Tampere, 
Turku, Oulu, Jyväskylä and Kuopio areas) increased from some 1.2 million to 1.7 mil-
lion (+40%). (Laakso & Loikkanen 2004, pp. 23-24) This urbanization trend in society 
also affected S-Group, and made its position more and more difficult since the main fo-
cus of its operations was still in the countryside (S-Kanava 2013c). This mismatch in 
society dynamics and S-Group’s focus was probably the main reason behind the decline 
of S-Group (the turnaround from which being the focus in this study), as briefly men-
tioned by e.g. latter CEO of S-Group, Jere Lahti (2001, p. 9). 
The developments in S-Group and the competitive field from late 1970s all the way to 
2000 are discussed much more deeply in the following sections of this study, as the de-
cline and especially turnaround in question took place during these decades. In brief, 
these decades included e.g. SOK giving up its own industry and the current (in terms of 
the number of stores, strongly reduced) network of regional cooperatives being estab-
lished. The development of the current co-op member program (S-Bonus) began also at 
the end of the 1980s. In early 1990s, the procurement and logistics company Inex Part-
ners began operations and took over the procurement, storage and distribution of the 
groceries of S-Group (and also Tradeka). Further, S-Group’s international activities as 
well as introduction of service station stores and fuel trade (ABC chain) marked the de-
velopment of S-Group in 1990s. (S-Kanava 2013c) 
All in all, the last 20 years of the 20th century meant a lot of restructuring in S-Group. 
Following this successful turnaround, the beginning of the 2000s was a phase of intense 
growth. For example, in grocery trade, the number of outlets in the Prisma, S-market, 
Sale and Alepa chains increased by over three hundred new units between 2000 and 
2012, from 556 to 877 outlets (S-Group 2000, p. 54, S-Group 2012, p. 49). Growth has 
meant also expansion to new areas, as e.g. the Kodin Terra chain, focusing on hardware, 
interior design and gardening sales, was established in 2005. S-Group’s annual turnover 
growth from EUR 6 billion3 in 2000 (S-Group 2000, p. 54) to over EUR 12 billion in 
2013 (S-Group 2012, p. 49) has also been supported by e.g. strong growth of ABC 
chain, expansion of international operations as well as most recently e-commerce opera-
tions (S-Kanava 2013c).  
 
5.1.2. Cooperative membership as a core of strategy 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the roots of cooperative based retailing date back 
to 1840 in England. Britain is also the home of cooperative ‘thinking’, or cooperative 
                                                 
3 S-Group sales of FIM 36.2 billion converted to EUR with a EUR/FIM exchange rate of 5.94573 (Bank 
of Finland 2013) 
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movement, in general: The Fenwick Weavers' Society was a professional association 
created in the village of Fenwick, Scotland. In 1769, the society formed a consumer co-
operative for the benefit of members, with the purpose of fostering high standards in the 
weaving craft. The activities later expanded to include collective purchasing of bulk 
food items and books. This practice of collective purchasing for the benefit of members 
has led many to consider Fenwick Weavers' Society the first co-operative, even if coop-
erative arrangements, such as mutual insurance, and principles of cooperation existed 
long before. (ICA 2013) The main principle of cooperative movement, i.e. ‘customer 
being in the centre’, has survived for 250 years without changing much. 
Official and international definition for a cooperative is determined by the International 
Co-operative Alliance (ICA), and it says: “A co-operative is an autonomous association 
of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs 
and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.” (ICA 
2013) For S-Group, the cooperative model is not only an ownership structure, but actu-
ally core of its strategy: “Co-op membership forms the core of S Group's strategy. The 
customers of cooperatives are also simultaneously their owners. Therefore, the business 
idea of a cooperative is to produce services and benefits for its co-op members.”  
The second sentence of the above S-Group’s strategy definition (“the customers of co-
operatives are also simultaneously their owners”) explains well also the main difference 
between cooperatives and limited liability companies. In cooperative movement there is 
no need to prioritise between customers and owners, whereas in limited liability compa-
nies the owner comes always first. Even if debatable in real life, this statement is sup-
ported by e.g. existing legislation: The Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act states 
that “the purpose of a company is to generate profits for the shareholders, unless other-
wise provided in the Articles of Association” (Ministry of Justice, Finland 2012), 
whereas the Co-operatives Act determines the purpose of a cooperative being “to pro-
mote the economic and business interests of its members by way of the pursuit of eco-
nomic activity where the members make use of the services provided by the co-
operative or services that the co-operative arranges through a subsidiary or otherwise” 
(Ministry of Justice, Finland 2001).  
In a nutshell, limited liability company should prioritise profitability of its operations 
(maximising profit for owners), while cooperatives have to promote “economic and 
business interest of its members (i.e. owners)” through members participating in coop-
eratives’ activities. One could argue, that a cooperative has more ‘flexibility’, as it can / 
should promote owners’ economic interests (either) through desirable services (used by 
the owner) or (/ and) direct financial benefit, whereas limited liability company is bound 
to the latter. Or as Lahti (2001, p. 92) puts it, a customer in limited liability company 
expects to receive goods and / or services as cheap as possible, whereas an investor ex-
pects to maximise profits. According to Lahti (2001, p. 93), this kind of paradox does 
not exist in cooperatives, as “the owner is simultaneously a customer”. Counter argu-
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ments for this thinking can be based on the fact, that in open cooperatives such as S-
Group (i.e. not all customers have to be members) the economic and business interest of 
members cannot come solely through the use of services, as also non-members can use 
the same services (Lahti 2001, p. 91). Thus, the operations of an open cooperative have 
to be financially profitable (ibid.), but still at the same time designed so that they fulfil, 
in addition to economic, also the “common social and cultural needs and aspirations of 
its owners / members”, as defined by ICA. 
In addition to customer-focused operations, another important (financial) aspect in S-
Group’s cooperative model is that any surplus profits created by operations are returned 
to owners in relation to the use of cooperative services. This is again a fundamental dif-
ference to limited liability companies, where profits are distributed in relation to share 
of ownership (shares). (Lahti 2001, pp. 92-93) 
In order to summarize, even if provocatively, the meaning of a cooperative movement, 
it can be argued that for a limited liability company it doesn’t matter if its customers are 
satisfied or not4, as long as operations are profitable. For a cooperative business this 
would be unacceptable, as unsatisfied customers would equal to (at least partly) unsatis-
fied owners. 
 
5.2. S-Group and Kesko dominating the Finnish consum-
er goods retailing 
The government has finalized the amendment of the competition law, with the changes 
aiming at increasing competition in consumer goods retailing. S-Group and Kesko have 
to adapt to requirements, which concern companies with dominant market position. 
(Maaseudun Tulevaisuus 20.12.2012) 
The new structural policy program of the government aims at increasing competition in 
retailing. Large supermarkets may be allowed to be built outside urban areas while 
preserving a compact urban structure. The program thus supports breaking the domi-
nant position of S-Group and Kesko in (city) planning. (Sajari, Helsingin Sanomat 
1.9.2013) 
These above citations related to recent political amendments show that the dominant 
position of S-Group and Kesko in the Finnish consumer goods retailing is beginning to 
somewhat worry at least the politicians. Finland has one of the most centralized markets 
                                                 
4 Obviously, customer satisfaction goes often hand-in-hand with demand and thus also profitability (see 
e.g. Rust & Zahorik 1993) 
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of consumer goods retailing in whole Europe, with the two leading chains dominating 
over 80% of the market (TEM 2012, p. 3). However, this has not always been the case, 
as for example shown in Figure 9. 
Even if there have been various competitors (other than Kesko) for S-Group, in this 
study the competitive dynamics are studied only between this pair. There are obvious 
research methodological reasons for this (e.g. quality over quantity, see chapter 1.4), but 
even more one practical reason makes it rather self-evident to limit the research on S-
Group and Kesko: the other (significant) market players present during S-Group decline 
exited the market one way or another until the end of S-Group turnaround scale of this 
study. Thus, there wouldn’t really be any other ‘constant’ benchmarking target for S-
Group in terms of competitive actions than Kesko.  
While Kesko was clearly the leading retailer in the beginning of 1980s, there was a third 
large chain in Finland competing closely with S-Group (Nielsen 2013). This third dom-
inating market player, T-Group, consisted of three ‘legs’: retail stores (owned by inde-
pendent retailers), consumer goods wholesalers and the central firm Tuko (Luoma-aho 
2000). T-Group and later Tuko Group were named based on the Finnish word ‘tuk-
kukauppa’ (‘wholesale’ in English), which largely defined the group’s central idea, i.e. 
wholesaling. Ironically, Lamberg & Tikkanen (2006, p. 835) claim, Tuko’s greatest 
problem was indeed this strong history in wholesaling, which made it virtually impossi-
ble for the company to adapt to the changing business environment. Eventually T-Group 
ended up facing heavy restructuring measures under the creditor banks’ control in the 
early 1990s. This was due to failed ownership restructuring in late 1980s and inefficient 
but heavy investments made during the same years, which led T-Group becoming over-
ly leveraged and close to bankruptcy. Organizational and business restructuring led to 
somewhat successful results, and profitable Tuko was acquired by Kesko in 1996. How-
ever, European Union competition authorities rejected the merger due to overly domi-
nant market position, which led to Tuko been largely sold in pieces by Kesko to e.g. 
Wihuri and Spar (largely owned by the Swedish Axfood). (Luoma-aho 2000) 
Another potential benchmark target to S-Group in 1980s would have been the so-called 
E-Group, or later Eka Group. While T-Group / Tuko resembled Kesko in terms of its 
ownership structure, E-Group was a cooperative like S-Group. E-Group’s history goes 
back to early 20th century, when certain, mainly urban and working-class cooperatives 
distanced themselves from the more bourgeoisie SOK and established a new central 
firm, OTK (S-Kanava 2013d). While wholesale focus was claimed to be partly behind 
T-Group’s collapse, Lamberg & Tikkanen (2006, p. 833) argue that E-Group suffered 
from its often politically active (leftist) members not tolerant toward rationalization at-
tempts by the management of the company. Most of the necessary managerial (restruc-
turing) measures were perceived to be against the socialistic ideas and principles that 
were the hard-ideological core of OTK / E-Group as an organization (ibid.). In early 
1990s Eka Group, active in e.g. construction and insurance business in addition to retail-
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ing (by that time called Tradeka), failed to survive the dramatic recession in Finland, 
resulting in restructuring after which the retailing business was no more operated 
through a cooperative structure (Kallenautio 2008). After various ownership changes 
the E-Group / Eka-Group / OTK / Tradeka heritage was until 2016 present in the Finn-
ish consumer goods retailing through Suomen Lähikauppa, a retailing company owned 
by the Swedish Private Equity company Triton, which then in 2016 was acquired by, 
not surprisingly, Kesko. 
Other companies / groups active in the Finnish consumer goods retailing during the 
1980s and 1990s include e.g. Elanto (close link to E-Group in 1980s but nowadays part 
of S-Group), Wihuri (merged with Tradeka in 2006), Stockmann and Spar (close link 
with the remaining of Tuko in 1990s) (Juntunen 2007). However, as described here, 
many of these have had close links to abovementioned four largest players (Kesko, S-
Group, T-Group and E-Group) and / or they have been rather local in their operations. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that S-Group and Kesko were the only nationwide enti-
ties operating with more or less same ownership structure in the Finnish consumer 
goods retailing throughout the period under analysis in this study. Actually, T-Group 
and E-Group could be largely considered as ‘failed’ turnaround attempts in the light 
where S-Group succeeded in turning around its own decline. 
 
Figure 9: Market shares in the Finnish consumer goods retailing in 1978-2000 (based on Nielsen 
2013). Note: T-Group and E-Group include the chains ‘surviving’ the restructurings, i.e. for example 
Spar and Tradeka respectively.  
 
5.2.1. Kesko as the most stable player in the market 
While S-Group suffered from decline in 1980s (discussed more in chapter 5.3), and T-
Group and E-Group more or less failed in their turnaround attempts in early 1990s, 
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Kesko has been enjoying from a rather stable and successful history during the last 30 
years or so (also evidenced by its market share development in Figure 9). 
Kesko is a listed trading sector company. It manages retail store chains and produces 
services for e.g. retail store chains' purchasing, logistics, network development and data 
management. Kesko's operations include the food, home and speciality goods, building 
and home improvement, and car and machinery trades. Its segments’ parent companies 
and chains act in close cooperation with retailer entrepreneurs. Kesko has about 2,000 
stores in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Belarus. 
(Kesko 2013) 
Kesko as such means basically the centralized group under Kesko Oyj, the publicly 
listed entity. Therefore, Kesko in broader extent is officially K-Group, which, in addi-
tion to the Kesko Group, includes also the K-retailers, i.e. independent entrepreneurs 
operating the stores. This is broadly comparable to the S-Group structure, where SOK is 
the central firm and regional and local cooperatives operate most of the retail stores. 
However, in this study Kesko is used as a common name for all K-Group’s activities in 
consumer goods retailing. (Kesko 2013) 
In 2012 K-Group’s net sales amounted to EUR 12 billion. Almost half of this was food 
trade, with home and specialty goods as well as building and home improvement repre-
senting together approximately the other half. (Kesko 2012) All in all size-wise Kesko 
and S-Group are very close to each other nowadays.  
Probably the main difference between otherwise largely similar Kesko and S-Group is 
the organizational and ownership structure. While S-Group is in the end owned by its 
customers (members), Kesko is owned by the entrepreneur retailers (individual stores) 
and owners of the publicly listed Kesko shares (over 40,000 shareholders at the end of 
2012) (Kesko 2012 p. 77). To explain this concretely, S-Group is owned ‘democratical-
ly’ (one-member-one-vote) by its over 2 million co-op members, whereas in Kesko the 
larger store the entrepreneur runs or the more shares a shareholder owns the more ‘pow-
er’ he or she has, both in terms of financial benefit (e.g. dividends) and, especially in 
terms of shareholding, voting power. 
Kesko’s structure has been mentioned as one of the reasons for its stable success 
throughout the years. According to Lamberg & Tikkanen (2006, p. 830), Kesko had the 
most flexible organization structure of the four largest groups in the market in 1980s:  
i. First, it was a combination of independent retailers with a light central adminis-
trative body.  
ii. Second, individual retailers had a strong (and direct) economic incentive to be 
flexible.  
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As a result of i. and ii., the company was never organized as a strict bureaucratic model, 
with rules and procedures leading to ‘rule-following’ behaviour.  
iii. Third, owing to the influence of the retailers that owned the company, Kesko 
never adopted the culture of a traditional wholesale organization (compared to 
e.g. T-Group). Consequently, it had the best possibility to exploit the market 
trend that strongly emphasized mass-retailing over wholesaling.  
Obviously, as all structures, also Kesko’s model had its negative sides, which are dis-
cussed more in the following chapters when benchmarking S-Group against Kesko. 
However, in big picture, Kesko has managed to overcome the various challenges in the 
market and competition throughout the years without dramatic declines in its perfor-
mance. Its market share was rather stable (see Figure 9) while it also remained clearly 
profitable even during the somewhat challenging years during 1990s (Kesko 1995). 
 
5.3. S-Group decline and turnaround timeline 
As previously defined, decline is viewed as an existence-threatening deterioration in an 
organisational performance induced by maladaption to changes in environment, while 
the turnaround means ensuring the continuing existence of an organisation through per-
formance improvement and sustainable competitive advantage. 
These qualitative definitions don’t necessarily make it possible to draw concrete ‘lines’ 
to a specific turnaround case, i.e. when did it start and end. However, neither did the 
more quantitative definitions as argued in chapter 2.1.1. As performance is nevertheless 
the main, even if rather abstract, variable when ‘framing’ a certain decline-turnaround 
process, some (changes in) indicators should be analysed to measure the (changes in) 
performance throughout such process. 
The main concrete performance indicator used in this study is market share, and more 
precisely how changes in market share can be used as a proxy for S-Group’s decline and 
turnaround. The use of market share instead of more tangible financial metrics is justi-
fied e.g. by the structure of S-Group. The cooperative set-up as such means that basic 
financial metrics such as sales and / or profitability don’t necessarily measure how well 
S-Group has performed considering its strategy and mission (“…the business idea of a 
cooperative is to produce services and benefits for its co-op members.”). Or as Lahti 
(2001, p. 90) mentions, cooperative’s profit can even be viewed as a ‘pricing error’. 
Further, as S-Group’s operations are largely run by the several regional / local coopera-
tives, it might be misleading to analyse only the financials of SOK. And as there are 
very limited financial metrics available that would take into account the group as a 
whole, it is justified to leave these individual financials to a lesser focus. 
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Another feature of this study supporting the use of market share as a performance indi-
cator is the focus on competitive dynamics and rivalry between S-Group and Kesko. As 
thoroughly discussed in chapter 3.4, I consider the competitive market as a field where 
it is decided if a company is performing well or not. This is well in line with the deci-
sion of employing (changes in) market share as the main indicator of (changing) per-
formance. To justify this by some more theoretical background, according to Porter 
(1980) the whole idea of strategy is to defend and improve competitive position, and 
thus market share, especially when compared to one’s closest rival(s), should qualify as 
a decent measure for the success of this strategy. Or more concretely, as my definition 
of competitive action states, a specific and detectable competitive move initiated by a 
firm in order to acquire its rivals' market shares […]. 
Thirdly, market share has been used rather widely also in other literature focusing on 
decline and turnaround. Mellahi et al. (2002, p. 16) define crisis-failure as an event or 
condition (or a series of events or conditions) that could lead to severe market share ero-
sion. In one of the earlier studies in the field, Hofer (1980, p. 21) mentions declining 
market share also having ‘some importance’ as an indicator of (weakened) performance. 
Ferrier et al. (1999) ground their whole research on market share erosion, and how 
changes in market share can be used as a dependent variable when benchmarking com-
petitive actions. 
In addition to market share also more qualitative features are discussed in the following 
in order to define a timeline for S-Group turnaround. I.e. how the company itself has 
expressed its performance and state, or how more retrospective studies / history writings 
have interpreted various stages in S-Group’s history. 
 
5.3.1. S-Group’s decline and ultimate crisis in early 1980s 
S-Group’s decline in 1970s and early 1980s is largely explained by the mismatch be-
tween S-Group’s focus on small stores in more rural areas and the urbanization trend in 
Finland (see e.g. chapter 5.1.1 and Lamberg et al. 2009). The market share data (not 
available in detail prior to 1978, but rather stable for S-Group in 1970s as shown in e.g. 
Lamberg et al. 2009, p. 54) in Figure 10 shows that S-Group’s market share dropped 
from clearly above 20% to close to 15% during the period from 1978 to 1986, before 
stabilising for the next 5 years or so. Thus, solely in the light of market share develop-
ment, S-Group’s decline could be argued to have taken place during 1978-1986. 
  64
 
Figure 10: S-Group market share in the Finnish consumer goods retailing in 1978-2000 (based on 
Nielsen 2013). 
As a more qualitative ‘flavour’ and in order to stress that S-Group truly was facing an 
existence-threatening deterioration, a quote from S-Group’s history writing (S-Kanava 
2013c) demonstrates the critical state of the group’s situation in early 1980s: At the turn 
of the 1980s, the situation had proceeded far enough to put all cooperatives in a finan-
cially difficult position which they were only to survive by resorting to savings funds 
and by liquidating property.  
In terms of the decline process and its stages, the early 1980s in S-Group were some-
what a combination of the blinded, inaction and faulty action stages as described in 
chapter 2.2.1 and Figure 11. As Heino (2007, p. 42) describes, the top management of 
SOK was indeed aware of the critical situation, but the local cooperatives were not 
ready to acknowledge the looming crisis. Here the decision-making structure of S-
Group has been said to work against it, as the collective, overly democratic governance 
of S-Group made it impossible to make fast, centralized decisions on e.g. closing down 
poor performing local cooperative stores (ibid., p. 41). In 1981 the inactivity was over to 
some extent, as SOK launched a restructuring program aiming at profitability in all units 
of the group. However, despite an encouraging start, a year later it was evident that 
much more concrete actions were required in order to tackle the decline. In 1982, S-
Group had been loss-making for 15 years in a row, its debt load was over FIM 3.1 bil-
lion and increasing by FIM 400 million annually, it was unable to even cover its interest 
costs with operative cash flow, and most severely, it had lost the confidence of its mem-
bers, resulting in increasingly declining market share. (Kangas 2004, pp. 103-106) 
 
5.3.2. Stabilisation and turnaround steps from S-83 to recovery in 1990s 
Probably the most concrete individual event in between S-Group’s decline and turna-
round (i.e. a ‘manifestation’ of the triggers for change phase as described in Figure 11) 
was the appointment of Juhani Pesonen as the SOK (basically S-Group) CEO in 1982 
  65
(Pesonen started officially as the CEO in July 1983). Pesonen was already known as a 
turnaround specialist from his previous post at Wihuri, and after 6 months’ evaluation 
period Pesonen launched the S-83 restructuring program, which was communicated 
throughout the organization as a series of radical must-do changes in order to avoid a 
‘heroic suicide’ of S-Group. With these structural changes, including e.g. lay-offs of 
more than 5,000 employees, S-Group was meant to be completely reorganized by the 
end of 1986. (Kangas 2004, pp. 103-106) 
Competitive actions included in the S-83 program and further recovery are described 
more in chapter Error! Reference source not found., but probably the main stabilisa-
tion / retrenchment areas after 1983 were focusing on core businesses and reorganising 
the structure of local cooperatives. This meant closing down and / or divesting e.g. in-
dustrial activities and merging local cooperatives into fewer regional units while cen-
tralising certain operations as well as decision making into SOK. These measures were 
obviously successful when looking at retrospectively, but they were in no way provid-
ing any ‘quick fix’ into S-Group’s problems. Market share continued its decline until 
1990 (even if largely stabilising during the latter years of 1980s) while S-Group’s finan-
cial state didn’t improve much either. (Heino 2007, pp. 48-51)  
Process wise this period from 1983 to 1990 in S-Group is therefore rather well in line 
with the background discussed in chapter 2.2, where it was noted that “once the future 
competitive areas and main focus have been defined, it is time to stop the declining per-
formance […]. These actions often involve retrenchment and downsizing, but quick fix 
results i.e. performance improvement doesn’t usually follow immediately.” S-83 did 
address the future competitive areas (focusing on core business), it led to retrenchment 
and downsizing (divestments and merging local cooperatives), while the performance 
improvement wasn’t evident either in financials or market share in whole 1980s. All in 
all, the period from the launch of S-83 until 1990 can be described as a combination of 
transition and stabilisation phases in S-Group’s decline-turnaround process. 
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Figure 11: Main stages in decline and turnaround process (mainly based on Weitzel & Jonsson 
1989, Balgobin & Pandit 2001, Pearce & Robbins 1992). Initially presented in chapter 2.2.4. 
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As mentioned earlier, it is quite impossible to determine when recovery phase and thus 
the whole turnaround ends, as companies have to continuously think their strategic deci-
sions in order to succeed – also during the so-called good times. In any case return to 
growth must be considered as long-term engagement. As Chowdyry (2002, p. 256) 
points out, “performance improvement should stretch over a long period of time to al-
low for recovery, lest firms be prematurely considered successful or unsuccessful”.  
S-Group’s market share started to climb in 1991 from the level of 16% reaching almost 
30% at the turn of the millennium. Calling early 1990s to be an end to S-Group’s turna-
round feels premature, as for example the economy of Finland was going through a 
strong recession, which also affected S-Group’s financial performance negatively de-
spite market share improvement (S-Group 1994). One ‘milestone’ in S-Group’s turna-
round was in 1995 when it achieved the market share of 22%, i.e. the level from where 
the declining trend started 17 years earlier. As such this milestone alone doesn’t define 
any specific point in S-Group’s turnaround, but at least it means that S-Group turna-
round met the criteria used by Pearce & Robbins (1992, pp. 295-296), i.e. performance 
(indicator) overtaking the pre-downturn level (of corresponding figure). 
During the latter half of 1990s Finnish economy boomed, Finland had joined the Euro-
pean Union and S-Group was undoubtedly the second largest player in the Finnish con-
sumer goods retailing. Stabilised external environment and successful market share de-
velopment ensured also S-Group’s decent financial performance. It is impossible to 
draw a concrete line when the turnaround ended successfully, i.e. when S-Group had 
ensured its continuing existence, but it should be safe to conclude that in 2000 this was 
the case (most likely some years earlier). In 2000 S-Group achieved its all-time high 
sales, profit as well as bonus payments to its members. All of its regional and local co-
operatives were profitable. The ABC chain of service station stores and fuel trade, 
launched in 1998 and nowadays representing 15% of S-Group sales, had also by 2000 
reached a level where it represented a meaningful competitive advantage in the field. (S-
Group 2000) These achievements as well as more modest market share growth and lim-
ited number of new strategic initiatives in early 2000s make is justified to limit the turn-
around scope of this study to end to year 2000. 
In a nutshell, I consider S-Group turnaround to span from 1980 to 2000. The first couple 
of years of this period still represented the pinnacle of the decline but at the same time 
looming transition towards a turnaround. These triggers for change were highlighted in 
the appointment of Juhani Pesonen as the CEO as well as his S-83 restructuring pro-
gram. Stabilisation period then spanned a few years forward from 1983, with the even-
tual recovery taking place in 1990s. 
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6. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS BEHIND S-
GROUP TURNAROUND 
As the turnaround timeline of S-Group has now been defined to span from 1980 to 
2000, the following step according to the research problem is to analyze the competitive 
dynamics between S-Group and Kesko during this period. As competitive dynamics ba-
sically means “how competitors actually interact in the marketplace via the on-going 
exchange of competitive moves” (Chen et al. 1992, pp. 439-440), the first step is to col-
lect the relevant competitive actions from case companies from the period under analy-
sis. This has been done by going through the annual reports of both companies and from 
these selecting such moves and actions that qualify, according to the criteria presented 
in chapter 3.2.3 and summarised below in Table 5, as specific, detectable and externally 
directed competitive moves initiated by a firm in order to defend or improve its competi-
tive position. 
Table 5: Modified list of (categories of) competitive actions (initially presented in chapter 3.2.3). 
1 New product 10 Product / market exit
2 Mergers and acquisitions 11 Product differentations
3 Price changes 12 Quality improvement (externally detectable)
4 Promotional actions (incl. product announcement) 13 Legal actions (aimed at competition / competitor)
5 Joint venture (effort) 14 New distribution channel
6 Service-based actions 15 Technology / internet-based action (externally detectable)
7 Market expansion (also geographic) 16 Retail outlet range / format
8 Investment in major resource (externally detectable) 17 Vertical integration
9 Major resource divestiture (externally detectable)  
Lists of S-Group’s and Kesko’s competitive actions during 1980-2000 are presented in 
Appendices 1 and 2 respectively. In addition to a short description of each competitive 
action and its year, a category number related to the above list of competitive action cat-
egories (see Table 5) is given to each action. This categorization is used to analyze the 
diversity of competitive actions performed. Further, a case specific classification is giv-
en to each action in order to analyze both the action-response dynamics between S-
Group and Kesko and the consistency of each company in their competitive behavior. 
The use of these categories and classifications are further described in the following 
sub-chapters focusing on the specific ‘metrics’ of competitive dynamics. 
Analyzing the listed competitive actions and dynamics between them is based on the 
characteristics of competitive behavior behind turnaround discussed in chapter 3.3. As 
mentioned there, based on the existing literature, in a nut shell, inactivity, sluggishness, 
lack of diversity or consistency and failure in positioning competitive actions vis-à-vis 
to competitors can lead to performance deterioration. Other way round, actively per-
forming competitive actions with certain aggressiveness while making sure that the ac-
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tions are consistent with the strategy and diverse in nature, can lead to good (i.e. in turn-
around case, improving) performance. In order to make these ‘metrics’ more tangible, 
the following features of competitive dynamics are analysed: 
1. Activity, i.e. number of competitive actions performed; 
2. Aggressiveness in competitive behavior, consisting of: 
a. Order of entry, i.e. which company executes the so-called initiative ac-
tion; and 
b. Response lag, i.e. how long it takes for the follower to respond to the ini-
tiator; 
3. Diversity, i.e. the breadth of a firm’s repertoire of competitive actions; and 
4. Consistency, i.e. how well a firm’s actions conjoin with the firm’s own history 
of competitive actions (and thus strategy). 
 
6.1. Activity in performing competitive actions 
As discussed earlier, inactivity in terms of competitive actions and accepting the status 
quo can be a major reason for declining performance, while also actively pursuing new 
competitive actions, even if not every time successful, teaches the organization on how 
to ‘play’ in the market. 
Based on the data regarding competitive actions of S-Group and Kesko (as presented in 
Appendices 1 and 2), below are figures illustrating the competitive activity of the two 
companies during the determined turnaround period of S-Group. 
 
Figure 12: Number of competitive actions performed by year during 1980-2000. 
As presented in Figure 12, S-Group performed rather consistently more competitive ac-
tions than Kesko especially in the beginning of the turnaround period, with annual aver-
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age of 4.1 actions for S-Group versus Kesko’s 2.9 annual actions on average in 1980-
2000. During 1980s, Kesko performed more actions than S-Group only in 1986. Then 
again in 1990s, i.e. during S-Group’s recovery period, Kesko outperformed S-Group 5 
times (1993-1995, 1997 and 2000). 
 
Figure 13: Development of the cumulative number of competitive actions performed during 1980-
2000. 
Figure 14: Difference in cumulative number of competitive actions performed and market share 
development during 1980-2000. 
While S-Group performed in total 26 more competitive actions than Kesko during the 
turnaround period, the difference in the cumulative number of performed actions actual-
ly peaked already in 1992 (see 
Figure 14). So, S-Group was very active in comparison to Kesko especially in the stabi-
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lisation phase, while in the recovery phase there was no meaningful gap in number of 
performed actions (albeit specific individual years).  
The peak in the delta of the cumulative number of performed actions (1992) coincides 
quite nicely with the actual turnaround in S-Group’s market share (which bottomed in 
1990). This would support the view, that the actions rarely have an immediate impact on 
performance (indicators), but rather take time to become evident in external metrics. Or 
as mentioned earlier, the forces of decline continue to hinder turnaround attempt even 
when the stabilisation is on its way. 
 
6.2. Aggressiveness in competitive behavior 
In order to analyze the aggressiveness in performing competitive actions, i.e. the com-
bination of order of entry and response lag (action-response dynamics), all competitive 
actions are mapped against the following case specific classification: 
Classification item S-Group Kesko
Expansion of non-core business 9 16
Divestiture in non-core business 27 14
Expansion of core business 8 8
Divestiture in core business 1 0
New  core business 2 0
Chain development 20 7
Non-chain thinking 0 2
Internationalisation 7 8
Efficiency improvement 6 4
Cooperative actions 6 1  
From these, Internationalisation is somewhat out of the scope of this study, as it does 
not directly impact consumer goods retailing and market shares in Finland. Actions 
classified as Efficiency improvement (e.g. outsourcing of IT services) are then again 
more internal measures to improve efficiency of operations and profitability without 
necessarily affecting competition as such. From other classification items, Divestiture in 
core business, New core business, Non-chain thinking and Cooperative actions have 
only limited number of actions for S-Group and / or Kesko. Therefore, the following 
comparison of aggressiveness is focusing on action-response dynamics under classifica-
tion items Expansion of non-core business, Divestiture in non-core business, Expansion 
of core business and Chain development. 
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Figure 15: Expansion of non-core business type of competitive actions and selected action-response 
chains. 
Within the classification item Expansion of non-core business, Kesko was more active 
than S-Group throughout the period, but in terms of action-response dynamics there 
aren’t any clear chains in order to determine aggressiveness as such. The solid line in 
Figure 15 shows actions related to expansion in clothing and fashion retailing, where 
Kesko expanded its operations quite remarkably during the period. S-Group responded 
in 1989 with some acquisitions in the clothing sector, but this hardly represents any 
fierce exchange of actions in order to gain relative competitive advantage. The dotted 
lines in Figure 15 refer to both companies investing in properties in 1988 and expansion 
of electronic & IT retailing (S-Group in 1984 and Kesko in 1997). Rest of the actions 
under this classification item represent even less any kind of action-response dynamics, 
which, however, is quite understandable as Expansion of non-core business is not really 
the item where one would expect most fierce exchange of competitive actions or com-
petition in general. 
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Figure 16: Divestiture in non-core business type of competitive actions and selected action-response 
chains. 
From all case specific classification items, S-Group performed most actions in Divesti-
ture in non-core business. These actions were largely performed during the first 10 
years of the turnaround period, which is nicely in line with the common view in litera-
ture that key part of stabilisation – or almost a synonym for that – is retrenchment, i.e. 
restructuring, downsizing and downscoping. And as quoted earlier in 4.2.2, “reducing 
assets or costs in an absolute sense does not always mean that efficiencies are gained or 
that a stabilised core of operations is achieved” (Barker & Mone 1994. p. 397), which 
makes it quite natural that S-Group focused its retrenchment on non-core businesses.  
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In terms of action-response chains, clear patterns don’t exist under this classification 
item either. The solid line in Figure 16 shows actions related to divestitures in industrial 
and business-to-business operations. Within these businesses S-Group could be seen as 
the more aggressive party to divest non-core operations, although it must be said that 
e.g. S-Group’s divestiture of chipboard and rye bread production in 1982 is not fully 
comparable to Kesko’s reindeer meat production divestment in the same year. Then 
again there are some clear comparable action-pairs as well, e.g. liquidation of egg pack-
aging by S-Group in 1985, a year before Kesko performed the exact same action. Or 
divestment of car retailing, where S-Group made actions in 1989-1990 and Kesko fol-
lowed in 1993 (the dotted line in Figure 16). 
All in all, under Divestiture in non-core business, S-Group performed 2/3 of its 27 ac-
tions in 1980s, whereas almost half of Kesko’s 14 actions were performed in 1996-
2000, so it is at least somewhat fair to conclude that S-Group was more aggressive of 
the two under this classification item. 
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Figure 17: Expansion in core business type of competitive actions and selected action-response 
chains. 
In Expansion of core business S-Group and Kesko both performed 8 actions during the 
analyzed period. Only three of these actions were performed in 1980s, i.e. the stabilisa-
tion period of S-Group. This is not surprising as stemming decline with retrenchment 
activities (especially divestitures of non-core business) was the most important focus 
area for S-Group during the decade. Actually, in 1985 S-Group closed down 500 stores 
(under Efficiency improvement) so expansion of network meaningfully at the same time 
would not have been very consistent. Kesko, on the other hand, did invest in its retail 
network through renewal of stores and establishment of corner stores (1984), continuing 
the expansion in 1986 and focusing investments from wholesale to retail in 1987. S-
Group’s only response was the acquisition of Alepa chain in 1987. This exchange of 
actions in retail network development, where Kesko was the more aggressive player, is 
illustrated by the solid line in Figure 17. 
The first dotted line in Figure 17 is related to business expansion in perishables trade to 
institutional and B2B clients. S-Group established a service to institutional clients in 
1985 with Kesko responding in 1993 by taking the responsibility of centralized supplier 
of perishables to Stockmann.  
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The second dotted line illustrates actions related to establishment and expansion of in-
ternet / mail-order businesses. S-Group established its mail-order business in 1993, 
Kesko responded by starting internet sales of consumer electronics in 1996 and both 
companies continued the expansion in 1999, with S-Group establishing S-Kanava web-
sales channel and Kesko opening its corresponding Netanttila web-store. In these two 
action-response chains S-Group was slightly more aggressive player.  
One more interesting action-pair under this classification item is S-Group’s develop-
ment of its 1998 launched (under New core business) ABC chain, i.e. service station 
stores and fuel trade. In 1999 and 2000 S-Group expanded ABC chain in several re-
gional cooperatives. For these, there is no action-response chain illustrated in Figure 17 
as Kesko did not respond until 2003 (i.e. outside the scope of this study) when it 
launched a cooperation with Neste Oil to compete with market leader ABC chain, which 
had already grown to 38 store wide chain (Taloussanomat 2003). 
Overall, under Expansion of core business, Kesko was the more aggressive player in 
expansion of the retail chain in 1980s, but then again S-Group performed initiative ac-
tions in few other areas, which were or became core businesses for both companies. So, 
one could conclude that Kesko was more aggressive during S-Group’s stabilisation 
phase whereas S-Group led the line during its recovery.  
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Figure 18: Chain development type of competitive actions and selected action-response chains. 
In Chain development S-Group was clearly more aggressive than Kesko in terms of per-
forming initiative actions. Kesko’s response lag was also rather long and the actual 
number of responding actions performed was low. Although Figure 18 shows only three 
specific action-response chains, all the ‘x’s and ‘o’s are more or less comparable actions 
as they were related to more organized as well as centrally managed and marketed busi-
nesses and / or business segments. Thus, it is clear from the Figure 18 as such, without 
even comparing specific actions and responses, that S-Group was more aggressive here. 
The solid line in Figure 18 illustrates more or less the true initiation of chain thinking in 
both parties’ history. In 1984, S-Group renovated its retail stores into 6 different seg-
ments including harmonizing of the strategies of these chains. In the same year, whole 
S-Group marketing was focused on creating new common image. Kesko didn’t respond 
until 1993, when it tightened its chain thinking, closed down small corner shop outlets 
and established new retail outlet segmentation. Similarly, S-Group was years ahead of 
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Kesko in terms of the development of its large supermarket chain Prisma, compared to 
Kesko’s Citymarket concept (illustrated by the first dotted line). 
The only, rather insignificant area, where Kesko was ahead of S-Group in Chain devel-
opment, was the combination of agricultural trade into chain in 1988 (illustrated by the 
second dotted line in Figure 18). 
In addition to these four case specific classification items analyzed more thoroughly, in 
Cooperative actions there is one, very important, action-response example which allows 
for direct comparability and thus assessment of aggressiveness. S-Group established its 
bonus scheme to co-op members in 1989 and this scheme was introduced to involve al-
so external partners in 1997. Kesko responded through introduction of its Plussa cus-
tomer loyalty scheme in 1997, i.e. 8 years after S-Group and at the same time when S-
Group expanded its scheme to external partners. 
All in all, S-Group can be said to have been more aggressive in its competitive actions 
than Kesko. Kesko was more aggressive in expanding its core business during S-Group 
stabilisation in 1980s, but in other areas and also in core business expansion during re-
covery S-Group was largely the initiating party. 
 
6.3. Diversity of competitive actions 
As discussed in chapter 3.3, diversity of performed actions is seen to affect firm perfor-
mance. Firms that carry out a broad set of action types can be seen as more capable and 
also as less predictable, while on the other hand, successful past can be a burden as suc-
cess may cause strategic simplicity, i.e. relying only on a narrow range of actions, and 
therefore result in organizational decline. 
In terms of analysing diversity of competitive actions performed by S-Group and Kes-
ko, all performed actions during 1980-2000 were categorized according to 17 categories 
presented in Table 5 on page 67. This categorization differs from the case specific clas-
sification and gives better picture of action diversity as it implies more how something 
is done whereas the classification states more of what is tried to achieve. For example, 
S-Group performed actions targeting Chain development (i.e. what) both through pro-
motional actions (e.g. establishment of common S-Group brand) and through product 
differentiations (e.g. chain-based assortments defined in perishables trade).  
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Figure 19: Number of competitive actions performed by category (see categories in Table 5). 
 
Figure 20: Relative share of competitive actions performed by category (see categories in Table 5). 
As illustrated in Figure 19 and Figure 20, S-Group performed most actions in categories 
9 (major resource divestiture) and 4 (promotional actions). Kesko was most active in 
categories 4 (promotional actions) and 2 (mergers and acquisitions). Both companies 
have also ‘empty’ categories, e.g. 13 (legal actions) and 17 (vertical integration). 
 
Figure 21: Cumulative share of actions by category with categories (x-axis) in decreasing order in 
terms of number of performed actions. 
Based on above and as clearly illustrated in Figure 21, there is no clear difference be-
tween S-Group and Kesko when it comes to distribution of competitive actions between 
categories as such. Both have approximately half of actions performed through 4 differ-
ent ways (as the categories tell how certain actions are performed), while after 10 differ-
ent ways there are only individual examples if any. One could argue that, as Kesko has 
6 empty categories versus S-Group’s 4 empty ones, S-Group was more diverse in that 
sense, but considering S-Group’s higher total amount of actions and above more or less 
equal cumulative distribution between categories, no significant value should be given 
to this data point. 
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Theoretical background for diversity of competitive actions says that performing actions 
(even if aiming at more or less same goal) in a different way from time to time makes 
them e.g. more difficult to predict and / or imitate. Thus, one additional way to analyze 
the diversity is to look at the distribution between categories (i.e. how) separately for 
each type of competitive action (i.e. what). 
For this we take the same list of classification as in 6.2 and from there items Expansion 
of non-core business, Divestiture in non-core business, Expansion of core business and 
Chain development, with the reasoning for choosing these items (and thus excluding 
other items) explained above in 6.2. 
 
Figure 22: Number of separate categories under selected classification items of competitive actions, 
i.e. number of different ways (how) of performing actions aiming at same type of goal (what). 
As Figure 22 shows, this additional way of analyzing diversity of actions does not bring 
much new to the table. S-Group had more diversity of actions when performing Divesti-
ture in non-core business and Chain development, but then again Kesko had more ways 
in targeting Expansion of non-core business and Expansion of core business.  
All in all, there seems to be no clear distinction between S-Group and Kesko in the di-
versity of competitive actions. Both relied on a rather limited amount of action types (in 
terms of how), as only 4 types accounted for more than half of all actions and then again 
approximately half of all potential action types (9 out of 17) accounted for almost 95%. 
 
6.4. Consistency of competitive actions 
Consistency of competitive actions refers to how well a firm’s actions conjoin with the 
firm’s own history of competitive actions (and thus strategy). As previously said, diver-
sity in competitive behaviour should not lead to gyrating but finding various and chang-
ing ways of executing continuous and consistent strategy – in other words, aiming at the 
same goal but with different kinds of shots. Consistency is here the same goal. 
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Analyzing strategic consistency is very case specific, i.e. it is difficult if not impossible 
to determine if a certain action is consistent with history based just on categories or 
classifications. For example, a divestiture in core business might well seem like incon-
sistent with in a simultaneous or closely timed investment in corresponding business. 
However, this might actually well be rather consistent if the divestiture and investment 
happen on different geographical regions, and thus meaning that a firm is just focusing 
its efforts on a specific area.  
Therefore, the analysis of consistency is done via going through the competitive actions 
of S-Group and Kesko under selected classification items and viewing if they indicate 
inconsistent behavior, or alternatively show patterns of consistency. The selected items 
are the same as in 6.2 and 6.3, i.e. Expansion of non-core business, Divestiture in non-
core business, Expansion of core business and Chain development. In addition, the ‘op-
posites’ of the latter two, i.e. Divestiture in core business and Non-chain thinking are 
also included to spot potential inconsistencies in those items. 
In Non-core business related items, expansion and divestiture, S-Group decided on sig-
nificant expansion of bakery operations in 1980 while divesting rye-bread production in 
1982. However, this does not as such imply inconsistency, as a retailer may well cut-
down on own-production while still increasing efforts in the business. Same goes for the 
liquidation of dressmaker’s factories in 1983 and acquisition of clothing retailing in 
1989. So actually, both of these rather indicate consistency and focus on the retailing 
side instead of covering the whole supply chain starting from production. This same 
consistent behavior can be seen throughout the 1980s, as S-Group exited also e.g. indus-
trial production, meat production, egg packaging, plastic factory, chocolate factory and 
furniture production. 
There are, however, also some slightly inconsistent actions under S-Group’s non-core 
business related items. It divested 80% of its agriculture trade in 1984 only to establish a 
joint venture in that business in 1988 before acquiring T-Group’s agriculture trade in 
1992. Also, S-Group sold car trade and import businesses in 1989-1990 but bought sim-
ilar type of business in 1996. The important feature in both these is that S-Group divest-
ed businesses during its stabilisation phase in 1980s while (re-)investing into those dur-
ing the years of recovery, i.e. 1990s. 
Kesko also sold its clothing production in 1984 while it invested remarkably to clothing 
trade in 1980. However, there is a clear inconsistency later in 1990s, when Kesko first 
acquired a fashion chain Aleksi13 in 1995 only to sell it four years later in 1999.  
Another slightly inconsistent move was to sell Kesko’s share in Kesoil, fuel trade busi-
ness, in 1985 as later in 2003 (although out of the scope of this study) Kesko finally an-
swered to S-Group’s successful ABC chain by creating a partnership with Neste Oil. 
Similarly, inconsistent move with a long time span in between, was the focus on proper-
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ty investment business in late 1980s while ten years later Kesko sold properties worth of 
1 billion FIM. 
All in all, there is some inconsistency visible in Kesko’s actions under Non-core busi-
ness related items while S-Group’s actions were very consistent during its stabilisation 
in 1980s before re-investing in couple of the exited businesses later in its recovery. 
In Core business related items S-Group focuses mainly on mail / web order business 
expansion (2 actions) and the establishment of service station chain ABC (2 actions). 
There was also the important milestone when acquiring the Alepa chain in food retail in 
1987. No inconsistent moves for these took place during the period of 1980-2000. In the 
limited amount of core business related actions, there is one inconsistent pair of entering 
the hardware store business in 1982 and then divesting the business in 1987. 
Kesko’s expansion in core business during the period was focusing on increasing the 
amount of retail outlets (4 actions) as well as establishment of web-sales (2 actions). 
There were no actions related to divestments in core business, so no noticeable incon-
sistent behavior either. 
Chain development was S-Group’s second most active area with 20 actions in total, with 
no actions under Non-chain thinking. More or less all of the 20 actions are related to 
more coordinated, nationwide chain-focus instead of fragmented and independent local 
operations. Examples such as new shared image in (nationwide TV) marketing, intro-
duction of chain-based assortments, decreasing the number of brands (e.g. Sokos mar-
kets turned into Prismas) and focusing the presence of brands (e.g. Alepa focusing into 
Southern Finland) all indicate more coordinated and harmonized approach. In other 
words, one could argue that S-Group’s goal in Chain development was towards fewer, 
larger and more coherent brands, with limited room for localized niche kind of thinking. 
With no actions that would be even somewhat inconsistent with this behavior, S-Group 
seemed to be very consistent in its Chain development. 
Kesko’s 7 actions in Chain development were also all aiming at more harmonized and 
coordinated brands and segments. Two actions were focusing on harmonizing product 
offering (establishment of so-called private label brands of Pirkka and Euroshopper), 
while 4 actions targeted more controlled chain thinking in general (e.g. 1993 action of 
‘Chain thinking increases and corner stores are shut down’). As mentioned in chapter 
6.2, Kesko was years behind S-Group in this chain thinking. In terms of inconsistency, 
and contrary to S-Group, Kesko focused its marketing actions to store specific promo-
tions in 1994, while in early 1980s it had even more diversely promoted store and area 
specific marketing. Despite this slight mismatch, Kesko can also be concluded to have 
been decently consistent in its Chain development, while been much slower and less ag-
gressive than S-Group. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The last chapter, conclusions, concludes the S-Group’s path from recovery to turna-
round through its competitive behaviour and the competitive dynamics vis-à-vis Kesko, 
and thus answers the research problem. I also discuss the above path in relation to exist-
ing literature and how S-Group’s turnaround is (or is not) following the theories pre-
sented in previous research. Finally, this last chapter includes research evaluation main-
ly in terms of limitations, reliability and validity, as well as concludes my thinking on 
relevant future research topics in the subject area. 
 
7.1. Discussion 
The research problem / question of this study is: Can the reasons for stopping the de-
clining performance and returning to (more) successful track be derived from the com-
petitive actions a company performs vis-à-vis its competitor(s)? If such observation is 
valid, what things in competitive behaviour vis-à-vis the competitor(s), i.e. competitive 
dynamics, support transition from decline to turnaround? 
As discussed in chapter 6, S-Group was clearly more active than Kesko in performing 
competitive actions, especially during the stabilisation years of 1980-1992. S-Group 
was in big picture also more aggressive than Kesko, i.e. making more of the initiating 
actions and / or answering to the competitor’s move(s) more rapidly. In terms of diversi-
ty and consistency of competitive behaviour, there were rather minor distinctions be-
tween S-Group and Kesko. Both companies actually relied on rather limited amount of 
action types in terms of diversity, and then again both were rather if not very consistent 
in their actions during the 20-year period.  In summary, and especially from S-Group’s 
perspective (i.e. the one performing a turnaround), it can be concluded that: 
S-Group was the more active and aggressive party especially during the stabili-
sation years of its decline-turnaround process, apart from the area of Expansion 
of (existing) core business, where Kesko was leading the line. Neither company 
was particularly diverse in terms of action types, but then again (or probably 
consequently) both were consistent in terms of targeted outcome, with S-Group 
especially showing very harmonious track throughout its 20-year turnaround 
path. 
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Therefore, in the light of this study and context of S-Group vs. Kesko, it can be argued 
that being (more) active and aggressive in performing competitive actions towards con-
sistent goals enable successful turnaround, while the diversity of action types, i.e. how, 
is not crucial for such improved performance. 
These findings are rather in line with existing literature as widely analysed and referred 
to in earlier parts of this study. For example, it is widely claimed that turnaround efforts 
almost always entail cutback, downsizing and cost reduction and thus term retrenchment 
would be an appropriate description for the stabilisation phase. Further, existing studies 
largely agree that inactivity is one of the main reasons for decline and that activity then 
again both increases the chances of succeeding and even if not, the firm creates internal 
organizational assets in the form of action repertoires, routines, and knowledge about 
how to carry out actions. Thus, S-Groups activity, aggressiveness and focus especially 
on Divestiture in non-core business (i.e. retrenchment) in the 1980s seems lot like an 
‘academic text-book example put into real life’ in terms of competitive behaviour in the 
stabilisation phase of a successful turnaround.  
Existing literature suggested, as discussed in chapter 4, that decline forces and causes 
imply certain guidelines for turnaround process. For example, as in the case of S-Group, 
internal issues as main cause of decline, lost stakeholder support (see chapter 5.3.1) and 
high decline severity together suggest i) major retrenchment, ii) under new management 
and, iii) aiming to strategic transformation.  
S-Group can be said to have gone through a major retrenchment in the 1980s. As a 
proof of this, almost one-third of its all competitive actions during 1980-2000 and as 
much as 40% of actions in the 1980s were under Divestiture in non-core business. Fur-
ther, 5 actions under Efficiency improvement during the stabilisation phase are also re-
lated to retrenchment type of behaviour.  
S-Group also checks the box of changed management. First, in 1983, Juhani Pesonen 
took over as the CEO with a strong mandate to ‘stop the bleeding’, realised in his S-83 
restructuring program. Then, in 1988, Jere Lahti was appointed to lead the recovery of 
S-Group after the heavy restructuring under Pesonen. 
However, the third ‘guideline’, i.e. strategic transformation as the long-term cure did not 
materialize at least in a drastic way in S-Group. As discussed in chapter 4.3.1, there are 
basically three paths for sustainable recovery from a severe decline: rebuild the compa-
ny on its prior strategic footprint; accept its new reduced form; and, strategic transfor-
mation. The first one is comparable to the concept of operative turnaround. As “opera-
tive responses seldom cure strategic problems”, neither was that the case in S-Group’s 
turnaround. Thus, S-Group’s story is likely best fitted somewhere in between the new 
reduced form and strategic transformation. 
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Speaking on behalf of the new reduced form, or niche hunting as used is some literature, 
is the feature of S-Group becoming much more focused when coming out of the 1980s 
and through the recovery. Divestitures in non-core business and focus on more stream-
lined retail operations resemble “longer-term strategy […] more focused, ‘leaner and 
meaner’, player in selected segments”, as said in 4.3.1. Also, there aren’t evident strate-
gic transformation features in the S-Group behaviour during its turnaround period. As 
described on pages 50-51, those could be new (main) business(es) through diversifica-
tion of the offering (did not happen), significant innovation (did not happen) or new 
(main) market(s) through Joint Venture, strategic alliance or vertical integration (did not 
happen). 
However, claiming S-Group turnaround did not include radical / transitional moves and 
was just down to becoming more focused feels incomplete. And actually, there is one 
element under strategic transformation types which in a way largely took place in S-
Group: Horizontal (acquisition / integration), i.e. growth through (acquiring) busi-
ness(es) operating at the same stage of production-marketing chain; aims at eliminating 
competition and increasing market share; offers economies of scale and improved effi-
ciency. 
S-Group did not make transformational acquisitions or anything, but it did very much 
harmonise the composition of its structure among independent local cooperatives and 
centrally governed decision-making. Reorganising the structure of local cooperatives, 
i.e. merging local cooperatives into fewer regional units while centralising certain oper-
ations as well as decision making into SOK, can be viewed as internal horizontal inte-
gration aiming at economies of scale, improved efficiency and even eliminating (inter-
nal) competition. Same goes with brand strategy of S-Group’s retailing, i.e. focusing on 
selected nationwide chains such as Prisma and S-Market (and later ABC chain, which in 
a way was also related diversification). 
7.2. Evaluation of research 
In qualitative research the researcher has a lot of freedom of interpreta-
tion, which then again requires certain ‘imagination’ (Eskola & Suoran-
ta 1998, p. 20). While solid theoretical background may increase the ob-
jectivity of a study, the researcher can never fully ignore his / her own 
values. Therefore, qualitative research cannot reach full objectivity – the 
researcher and action(s) / phenomenon under research are always tied 
into each other. In other words, qualitative methodology recognizes that 
the subjectivity of the researcher is intimately involved in scientific re-
search. Further, the results of qualitative research are conditional, i.e. 
arguments are ‘restricted’ by certain time and place. (Hirsjärvi et al. 
2000, p. 152) Thus, should this study be performed after some years, the 
results / conclusions might be different. 
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Against the above background, at least the ‘restriction’ by time should be less of a con-
cern in the quality of this study, as the empirical case focuses on historical events years 
back and even more years in terms of the length of the studied period. Similarly, the ex-
isting literature on this field and extensively analysed as part of the study is, in my opin-
ion, equally up-to-date no matter if it was Weitzel & Jonsson 1989 or Smith & Graves 
2005. However, this is not to say the objectivity of the study should be taken as granted. 
While I feel the theoretical background is both extensive and solid, the subjectivity of 
the researcher plays an unavoidable role in e.g. classifying and analysing the competi-
tive actions. Here, then again, the support and input from the quality interviewees limits 
at least to some extent the impact of subjectivity of solely the researcher. 
As introduced in chapter 1.4.3, and contrary to use of validity and reliability as such, I 
ended up using the criteria presented by Stenius et al. (2008) to evaluate the overall 
quality of this study: 
1. Significance of the data set and its social or cultural place 
2. Sufficiency of the data, and coverage of the analysis 
3. Transparency and repeatability of the analysis. 
The competitive dynamics behind S-Group turnaround is derived from the competitive 
actions collected from S-Group’s and Kesko’s Annual Reports, so the social and cultur-
al state of the data should be rather constant over time thanks to common regulation. 
Similarly, those externally observable actions are the only ones publicly available (and 
thus repeatable for another researcher) from the period under review, so the sufficiency 
of the data is basically limited and given – be it enough or not for a quality research 
work. 
Probably the main concern regarding the quality of this research is related to transpar-
ency of analysis. As the study combines somewhat complex concepts of decline-
turnaround and competitive dynamics, and puts those two together while adding rather 
long empirical case period spiced up with some factors from firm’s ‘internal layer’ (see 
Figure 4), the concoction starts to be quite multifaceted. Therefore, the repeatability of 
the analysis with same conclusions, despite the coherent data-set, might be somewhat 
problematic, as there are so many corners where to turn along the way. As the research-
er, I can only hope that the chain of reasoning behind reported results is clear enough. 
 
7.3. Future research topics 
As discussed earlier, decline-turnaround phenomenon and competitive dynamics are 
both common and well-researched, as well as largely ‘timeless’ topics. However, as ev-
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ident in the theory-building of this study and based on existing literature, there isn’t at 
least an overflow of these two concepts being put together. Thus, I see clear place for 
more studies combining decline-turnaround (or maybe some part of this continuum) 
with angles from competitive dynamics to create improved understanding on these phe-
nomena. 
While digging into the decline-turnaround process of S-Group, I could not hide the feel-
ing how interesting it would be to study more the decision-making behind externally 
observed competitive actions. While the interviews with two former S-Group CEOs 
were utilised to gain their input on e.g. classification of actions and validation of the de-
cline-turnaround ‘storyline’, there would be a great setting now afterwards to discuss 
again and ask for reasoning to the observed behaviour. How much of the observed was 
strategically planned? How well ahead? How much concretely thought ‘against’ the 
competition (Kesko especially)? These are all questions that pop-in mind and would 
nicely turn into a study with more organisational decision-making angle than pure com-
petitive dynamics. 
Then again, from the actual competitive dynamics angle, it would be very intriguing to 
dig deeper into more detailed analysis of certain action-response-chains. How did a firm 
react to competitor’s certain move? How was the response made? If not made, why? 
How many steps ahead were pre-thought? This kind of study would improve the under-
standing of pure competitive dynamics and its role in turnaround. To be realistic, 
though, one would have to limit the analysis to much more recent event and shorter 
time-period in order to analyse all the nuances, details, people and their memories etc. 
required for understanding a specific action-response chain for example. Sole listings 
from annual reports would not be enough for this. 
Finally, from more behavioural science point-of-view, it would be interesting to learn 
how people and different stakeholders feel about going through a turnaround process. 
How long does the ‘stamp’ of failure stay in the minds of e.g. employees and custom-
ers? How does it affect their behaviour, if at all? How about employer image? Declining 
companies would need the best people to turn things around, but it’s at least rather easy 
to make a hypothesis that best people are not probably that enthusiastic on joining / 
staying in such environment. 
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Table 6: S-Group competitive actions 1980-2000 (based on S-Group Annual Reports) 
# Year Competitive Action Category Case-specific classification
1 1980 Signif icant expansion of bakery operations 8 Expansion of non-core business
2 1980 Chain development: Rautasokos and Konesokos chains established 4 Chain development
3 1981 Properties sold 9 Divestiture in non-core business
4 1981 Export increased by 50% 7 Internationalisation
5 1981 Television as a main channel in nationw ide marketing; new spapers in local marketing 4 Chain development
6 1981 Chipboard factory liquadated 10 Divestiture in non-core business
7 1981 Signif icant co-op member acquisition campaigns 4 Cooperative actions
8 1982 Major restructuring in slected large local cooperatives 9 Efficiency improvement
9 1982 Hard rye bread production liquadated 10 Divestiture in non-core business
10 1982 Helsinki dressmaker's factory liquadated 9 Divestiture in non-core business
11 1982 SOK enters hardw are store business 16 Expansion of core business
12 1983 Large department stores, hotels, hardw are stores and machinery trade to be combined into nationw ide chains 16 Chain development
13 1983 Pori grain factory liquadated in order to increase the utilisation rate in other factories 9 Efficiency improvement
14 1983 Dressmaker's factories liquadated 9 Divestiture in non-core business
15 1984 S-Group brand established 4 Chain development
16 1984 Selected industrial production units sold 9 Divestiture in non-core business
17 1984 80% of SMK (agriculture trade) sold 9 Divestiture in non-core business
18 1984 SOK and local cooperatives establish low -cost stores 16 Chain development
19 1984 Retail store chains renovated 8 Chain development
20 1984 New  shared image as a focus in marketing 4 Chain development
21 1984 LaserCenter electronic store established 1 Expansion of non-core business
22 1985 Ow nership in OK-Liha (meat production) sold 9 Divestiture in non-core business
23 1985 Ow n egg packaging liqudated 10 Divestiture in non-core business
24 1985 Institutional catering service established delivering perishables to institutional clients 14 Expansion of core business
25 1985 New  restructuring program S-90 planned: including e.g. focusing industrial production to only selected items 10 Divestiture in non-core business
26 1985 Closing dow n of 500 stores 9 Efficiency improvement
27 1986 Acquisition of a w hite goods chain 2 Expansion of non-core business
28 1986 Sale of printing house 10 Divestiture in non-core business
29 1987 Prisma stores included in the "list" of strategic chains: low er margins defined as a competitive advantage for Prismas 4 Chain development
30 1987 Acquisition of Alepa chain 2 Expansion of core business
31 1987 Foodstfuff industry and textile fabrication of SOK and E-Group combined into Meira Oy 5 Divestiture in non-core business
32 1987 Rautaässä stores (hardw are stores) divested 9 Divestiture in core business
33 1987 Sock factory sold 9 Divestiture in non-core business
34 1987 Plastic factory sold 9 Divestiture in non-core business
35 1988 Joint venture Hankkija-Maatalous established in agriculture trade 5 Divestiture in non-core business
36 1988 Sale of chocolate factory and furniture production 10 Divestiture in non-core business
37 1988 Marketing focus on nationw ide chain based leaflets 4 Chain development
38 1988 Chain based assortments defined in perishables trade 11 Chain development
39 1988 Chain based thinking brought into restaurant business 4 Chain development
40 1988 SOK involved as a developer in retail properties including S-Group's stores 8 Expansion of non-core business
41 1988 Almost all Sokos markets turned into Prisma markets 16 Chain development
42 1989 Acuisitions in clothing retailing 2 Expansion of non-core business
43 1989 Lapin Auto Oy (car trade) sold 2 Divestiture in non-core business
44 1989 Co-op member bonus scheme established 4 Cooperative actions
45 1989 Sale chain established from smaller S-Markets and larger corner strores 16 Chain development
46 1989 Marketing of IT services to external clients ended 10 Divestiture in non-core business
47 1990 Procurement and delivery (i.e. w holesale) of perishables transferred into Inex Partners Oy, a joint venture w ith E-Group 5 Efficiency improvement
48 1990 Development of international procurement 5 Internationalisation
49 1990 Maanteho Oy (car importer) sold partly 9 Divestiture in non-core business
50 1990 Alepa chain focused on Southern Finland 16 Chain development
51 1991 Metal and garage product trade sold 9 Divestiture in non-core business
52 1991 IT services outsourced 9 Efficiency improvement
53 1991 Suomen Kuluttajaosuustoiminnan Liitto ry established w ith E-Group 5 Cooperative actions
54 1991 Meira liquadates domestic primary industry production  and clothing facrication 10 Divestiture in non-core business
55 1992 Home electronics trade sold to a joint venture together w ith T-Group and E-Grop 5 Divestiture in non-core business
56 1992 Hardw are and garden trade procurement and institutional sales sold to a joint venture w ith E-Group 5 Divestiture in non-core business
57 1992 SOK acquires the w hole Hankkija-Maatalous (agricultural trade) to itself 2 New  core business
58 1992 Bonus scheme developed extensively w ithin SOK and regional / local cooperatives 4 Cooperative actions
59 1992 CitySokos perishables departments turned into S-Markets 16 Chain development
60 1992 Hankkija–Maatalous acquires Tuko–maatalous Oy (T-Group's agriculture trade) 2 Expansion of core business
61 1992 Agri-Market chain established in agriculture trade 4 Chain development
62 1993 Mailorder sales established 14 Expansion of core business
63 1994 Property investment company sold to Varma 9 Divestiture in non-core business
64 1995 Price decreases due to EU membership carried out faster and larger than competitors 3 Chain development
65 1995 CitySokos opened in Tallinn 7 Internationalisation
66 1996 Major investments in department store business especially in Prismas 16 Chain development
67 1996 SOK sells properties 9 Divestiture in non-core business
68 1996 Investments in hotel business 8 Expansion of non-core business
69 1996 Valioasut turned into Sokos–fashion in order to f it the overall chain image 4 Chain development
70 1996 Car sales established in Estonia 7 Internationalisation  
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71 1996 SOK acquires car dealership 2 Expansion of non-core business
72 1996 First S-Group w eb-pages opened 15
73 1997 S-Group bonus scheme introduced to involve external partners 4 Cooperative actions
74 1998 Large markets under heavy investments 16 Chain development
75 1998 SOK acquires Rainex 2 Expansion of non-core business
76 1998 Pilot ABC station (service station store and fuel trade) established 14 New  core business
77 1998 Sale and lease-back of several important properties 9 Divestiture in non-core business
78 1998 Hankkija–Maatalous expansion to Estonia 7 Internationalisation
79 1998 Sale of hotel Hesperia to Radisson SAS and a cooperation agreement betw een SOK  and Radisson SAS 5 Internationalisation
80 1998 Pilot in connecting co-op members into S-Group information netw ork 15 Cooperative actions
81 1998 Electricity trade in cooperation w ith Vattenfall initiated 1 Expansion of non-core business
82 1999 SOK sells Radiolinja shares 9 Divestiture in non-core business
83 1999 S-Kanava active in w eb-sales established 14 Expansion of core business
84 1999 Prisma chain established in Estonia 7 Internationalisation
85 1999 ABC chain expansion in several regional cooperatives 8 Expansion of core business
86 1999 Cooperation w ith German Ernst Brinkmann KG in home electornics retailing in Finland 5 Efficiency improvement
87 2000 ABC chain expansion in several regional cooperatives 8 Expansion of core business  
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Table 7: Kesko competitive actions 1980-2000 (based on Kesko Annual Reports) 
# Year Competitive Action Category Case-specific classification
1 1980 Assortment of perishables decreased 11 Efficiency improvement
2 1980 Clothing trade developed remarkably and K–Vaatehuone concept established 4 Expansion of non-core business
3 1981 First K–Kotikeskus (interior and leisure trade) opened 1 Expansion of non-core business
4 1982 Reindeer meat procurement and cutting divested 9 Divestiture in non-core business
5 1982 Electronic code reader point-of-sales equipment launched in K stores 15 Efficiency improvement
6 1983 Individual, store specif ic marketing increased 4 Non-chain thinking
7 1983 Oy Suomen Väri – Finska Färg Ab (interior goods trade and installation) acquired 2 Expansion of non-core business
8 1984 Renew al of stores and establishment of corner stores as focus areas in perishables trade 16 Expansion of core business
9 1984 Even more strong focus on area and store specif ic marketing 4 Non-chain thinking
10 1984 Divestment of clothing industry 10 Divestiture in non-core business
11 1985 Kesmotors chain established in small machinery trade 4 Expansion of non-core business
12 1985 Bicycle assembly business divested 10 Divestiture in non-core business
13 1985 Acquisition of clothing retailers 2 Expansion of non-core business
14 1985 Divestment of Finnkesko AB (sales company in Sw eden) 10 Divestiture in non-core business
15 1985 Sale of Kesoil (fuel trade) shares 9 Divestiture in non-core business
16 1986 Launch of Pirkka product family 4 Chain development
17 1986 Egg packaging business divested 10 Divestiture in non-core business
18 1986 K-store netw ork expanded signif icantly through new  store establishments as w ell as renovations 16 Expansion of core business
19 1987 Focus of investments from w holesale to retail netw ork development 8 Expansion of core business
20 1987 Credit card company K-luotto established together w ith Kesoil 5 Expansion of non-core business
21 1988 Development of property investment business through share ow nership in Osakaskiinteistöt Oy 2 Expansion of non-core business
22 1988 Pan-Nordic fruit and vegetable procurement company established 5 Internationalisation
23 1988 Local agriculture trade centers combined into a chain 4 Chain development
24 1988 Forestry products divested 10 Divestiture in non-core business
25 1989 Marketing cooperation agreement w ith the Finnish Olympic Committee 4
26 1990 Material and logistics services sales to industrial companies initiated 1 Expansion of non-core business
27 1991 Viking Coffee Oy (roaster) established together w ith the Sw edish ICA 5 Internationalisation
28 1991 Several Citymarket stores established 16 Expansion of core business
29 1992 Non-profitable K-store units closed dow n 9 Efficiency improvement
30 1992 Kesko enters Intersport chain to develop its internaitonal cooperation 5 Internationalisation
31 1992 International cooperation in fresh products increases - Kesko enters pan-Nordic fruit brand  Rico 5 Internationalisation
32 1993 Chain thinking increases and corner stores are shut dow n 16 Chain development
33 1993 Stockmann agrees to centralize its perishables procurement to Kesko 5 Expansion of core business
34 1993 Kesko sells VV–auton car retailing and focuses only on import 10 Divestiture in non-core business
35 1993 Entry to Baltic markets 7 Internationalisation
36 1993 Major investments in K-store chain development and segmentation (corner stores, markets ,supermarkets, citymarkets) 16 Chain development
37 1994 Marketing focused on store type specif ic promotion 4 Chain development
38 1994 New  establishments in Citymarket chain and K–rauta hardw are stores 8 Chain development
39 1995 Expansion to Russia and Sw eden 7 Internationalisation
40 1995 Kesko acquires Aleksi 13 chain to expand into fashion trade 2 Expansion of non-core business
41 1995 First Europshopper products launched 4 Chain development
42 1996 Kesko acquires T-Group (Tuko), but majoity of it divested later due to EU merger control interference 2 Expansion of core business
43 1996 Keskometal sold to Rautaruukki 10 Divestiture in non-core business
44 1996 Kaukomarkkinat group acquired in order to improve import 2 Efficiency improvement
45 1996 Internet sales started in consumer electronics business 15 Expansion of core business
46 1996 Acquisition of rest of the Viking Coffee shares 2 Expansion of non-core business
47 1997 Plussa loyal customer scheme initiated 4 Cooperative actions
48 1997 Acquisition on the f ield of computer and ICT retailing 2 Expansion of non-core business
49 1997 Toy retailing liquadated 10 Divestiture in non-core business
50 1997 Ow n securities investment company established 1 Expansion of non-core business
51 1998 Properties sold w ith approx. EUR 1 billion 9 Divestiture in non-core business
52 1998 Tähti–optikko (optician) chain established 1 Expansion of non-core business
53 1998 Carrols chain expanded to a nationw ide fast food practice 8 Expansion of non-core business
54 1998 New  Anttila Kodin Ykköset (interior goods) stores (12) established 8 Expansion of non-core business
55 1998 Rautia stores sold to independent retailers 9 Divestiture in non-core business
56 1999 Netanttila w eb-store opened 15 Expansion of core business
57 1999 Carrols chain expanded further 8 Expansion of non-core business
58 1999 Clothing chains (e.g. Aleksi 13) sold 9 Divestiture in non-core business
59 1999 Agriculture trade established in Latvia 7 Internationalisation
60 2000 Outsourcing of e.g. property maintenance and ad agency 9 Divestiture in non-core business
61 2000 Acquisitoin of Telko Oy 2 Internationalisation  
 
